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Simulating Prevented Planting Coverage Factors based on Cost Reimbursement

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  • Boyer, Christopher N.
  • Duncan, W. Hence
  • Park, Eunchun

Abstract

The prevented planting provision in United States crop insurance reimburses producers when they are unable to plant. These indemnities are calculated by using a coverage factor (CF) of the insurance level. We simulated CFs that reimburse land rent and two payment values for inputs for corn and soybean production. Simulations were established to generate county-level distributions of CFs as well as changes in U.S. expenditures if the CFs were established to reimburse land rent and input costs. We found that the CF for corn is likely compensating claims more than the soybean CF, despite the soybean CF being higher than corn.

Suggested Citation

  • Boyer, Christopher N. & Duncan, W. Hence & Park, Eunchun, 2024. "Simulating Prevented Planting Coverage Factors based on Cost Reimbursement," Journal of the ASFMRA, American Society of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers, vol. 2024, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:jasfmr:342912
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.342912
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    References listed on IDEAS

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