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Reflections on the Exceptional Treatment of Agriculture in the WTO

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  • Josling, Timothy E.

Abstract

The GATT gave special treatment to agriculture by allowing quantitative import restrictions when domestic output was also controlled, and made an exception to the ban on export subsidies by allowing them for primary products, subject to somewhat weak and imprecise conditions. Both were concessions to the operation of domestic farm policies in developed countries, primarily the US and the UK and later Canada and the EU, and full advantage was taken of these legal exceptions. Subsidies in general had been treated leniently in the GATT with merely the obligation to notify if they impacted upon exports. Domestic subsidies for agricultural products had significant impacts on both imports and exports and were seen to be a significant part of the trade problem, but operated under minimal constraints. So the exceptional treatment of agriculture in the GATT had led to a dysfunctional trade regime. The Uruguay Round faced up to the inchoate conditions on world markets and the deterioration of trade relations that these exclusions allowed. The Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) specifically banned quantitative restrictions on imports, except those introduced to guarantee access and banned new export subsidies, capping and reducing existing expenditures on the programs and the volumes that could be subsidized. Domestic subsidies that were deemed to be most trade-distorting were capped and modestly reduced. The Doha Round would, if completed, eliminate export subsidies, severely limit the ability to provide trade-distorting support, and reduce the bound tariffs by a considerable extent. The URAA was negotiated at a time when the US and the EU were the main players in the agricultural policy space and it represented a way of disciplining trade to avoid conflicts and reduce protection. Domestic policies were reformed in a way that was consistent with the URAA constraints. If the Doha Round is successful, most of the special provisions for agriculture will no longer be needed. But at that stage the URAA may inadvertently hamper the process of developing trade rules that meet new challenges. Der Agrarsektor erfuhr im GATT eine Sonderbehandlung, indem quantitative Einfuhrbeschränkungen im Falle der Beschränkung der heimischen Produktion erlaubt wurden. Zudem wurde der Agrarsektor vom Verbot für Exportsubventionen ausgenommen: Sie wurden für Primärprodukte unter relativ schwachen und unpräzisen Bedingungen erlaubt. Dies waren Zugeständnisse an die Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten inländischer Agrarpolitik in Industrieländern, und die rechtlichen Ausnahmeregelungen wurden vor allem von den USA und dem Vereinigten Königreich, später auch von Kanada und der EU, intensiv genutzt. Subventionen wurden im GATT im Allgemeinen nachsichtig behandelt : Es bestand lediglich eine Notifikationspflicht, wenn sie sich auf die Exporte auswirkten. Inländische Subventionen für Agrarprodukte hatten allerdings häufig starke Auswirkungen auf den Außenhandel, dennoch gab es kaum Beschränkungen für ihren Einsatz. Somit resultierte die Sonderbehandlung des Agrarsektors im GATT in einem weitgehend dysfunktionalen Handelsregime. Die Uruguay-Runde beendete die weitgehende Regelungsfreiheit des Weltagrarhandels. Mengenbeschränkungen auf Importe wurden im Agrarabkommen (URAA) von wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen ausdrücklich verboten. Für die Ausgaben für Exportsubventionen sowie die subventionierten Exportmengen wurden Obergrenzen eingeführt und sukzessive reduziert. Die am stärksten handelsverzerrenden inländischen Subventionen wurden ebenfalls beschränkt und reduziert. Im Falle eines Abschlusses der laufenden Doha-Runde würden Exportsubventionen ganz unterbunden, die Möglichkeiten für handelsverzerrende inländische Subventionen stark eingeschränkt und die gebundenen Zollsätze erheblich abgesenkt. Das URAA wurde zu einer Zeit verhandelt, zu der die USA und die EU die wichtigsten Akteure in der agrarpolitischen Landschaft darstellten. Es eröffnete die Möglichkeit, Außenhandel zu regeln, um Konflikte zu vermeiden und den Außenschutz zu verringern. Inländische Politiken wurden gemäß den Beschränkungen des URAA reformiert. Wenn die Doha-Runde erfolgreich ist, werden die meisten der Sonderbestimmungen des URAA für die Landwirtschaft nicht mehr gebraucht werden. An diesem Punkt könnte das URAA unbeabsichtigt die Entwicklung von Handelsregelungen, die den neuen Herausforderungen gerecht würden, behindern. Viele der Bestimmungen des URAA waren als Übergangsregeln wichtig, es stellt sich aber die Frage, an welchem Punkt wir uns vom URAA lösen sollten und welches Regelwerk wir stattdessen brauchen.

Suggested Citation

  • Josling, Timothy E., 2010. "Reflections on the Exceptional Treatment of Agriculture in the WTO," German Journal of Agricultural Economics, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department for Agricultural Economics, vol. 59(Supplemen), pages 1-14, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:gjagec:146508
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.146508
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Irwin,Douglas A. & Mavroidis,Petros C. & Sykes,Alan O., 2008. "The Genesis of the GATT," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521515610.
    2. Timothy E. Josling & Stefan Tangermann & T. K. Warley, 1996. "Agriculture in the GATT," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-37890-2, December.
    3. Anderson,Kym (ed.), 2010. "The Political Economy of Agricultural Price Distortions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521763233.
    4. Kym Anderson, 2009. "Distortions to Agricultural Incentives : A Global Perspective, 1955-2007," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 9436.
    5. Orden,David & Blandford,David & Josling,Tim (ed.), 2011. "WTO Disciplines on Agricultural Support," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107005440.
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    Cited by:

    1. Whalley, John, 2013. "Regional Agreements: A Stocktaking Based on WTO Notifications," Commissioned Papers 156228, Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy Research Network.
    2. Timothy E. Josling & Stefan Tangermann, 2015. "Transatlantic Food and Agricultural Trade Policy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15889.

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