First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge

Citations

Cited by:

1. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2003. "Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions," Working Papers 85, Barcelona School of Economics.
   • Pezanis-Christou, P. & Sadrieh, A., 2003. "Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions," Discussion Paper 2003-58, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
   • Pezanis-Christou, P. & Sadrieh, A., 2003. "Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions," Other publications TiSEM c037828e-dcce-4af4-9125-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   • Paul Pezanis-Christou & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2003. "Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 578.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
2. Vasiliki Skreta, 2011. "On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(1), pages 1-36, March.
   • Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000222, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Working Papers 08-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
   • Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics.
3. Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 2001. "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 501-525, October.
   • Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997. "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information 9707010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Apr 1998.
   • ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998. "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   • ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 2001. "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1596, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
4. Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 9, pages 319-356, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
   • Fang, Hanming & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Multidimensional private value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 1-30, January.
   • Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1423, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
   • Stephen Morris & Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm387, Yale School of Management.
   • Stephen Morris & Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 174, Econometric Society.
   • Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Theory workshop papers 121473000000000021, UCLA Department of Economics.
5. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 113-132.
   • Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
   • Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Working Papers halshs-00586039, HAL.
   • Laurent Lamy, 2012. "The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Post-Print halshs-00754606, HAL.
   • Laurent Lamy, 2012. "The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754606, HAL.
   • Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586039, HAL.
6. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2017. "First‐Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 107-143, January.
   • Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2018R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Sep 2016.
   • Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2018R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2016.
   • Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Brooks, Benjamin A, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," CEPR Discussion Papers 10792, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2018R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2015.
   • Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2018, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
   • Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," CEPR Discussion Papers 11782, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin A. Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001031, UCLA Department of Economics.
7. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
   • Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
   • Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
   • Kaplan, Todd R & Zamir, Shmuel, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," MPRA Paper 54656, University Library of Munich, Germany.
8. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2006. "Asymmetric Auctions: Analytic Solutions to the General Uniform Case," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000410, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2006. "Asymmetric Auctions: Analytic Solutions to the General Uniform Case," Discussion Paper Series dp432, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
9. Helmuts Āzacis & Péter Vida, 2015. "Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 125-160, January.
   • Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, P ter, 2012. "Collusive Communication Schemes in a First-Price Auction," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/11, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
10. Momparler, Juan & Gregori, Pablo, 2011. "Qualitative analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 220-222, March.
11. Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2001. "The Swiss UMTS spectrum auction flop: Bad luck or bad design?," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,50, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    • Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2001. "The Swiss UMTS Spectrum Auction Flop: Bad Luck or Bad Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 534, CESifo.
12. Dirk Bergemann & Johannes Horner, 2010. "Should Auctions Be Transparent?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000128, David K. Levine.
    • Dirk Bergemann & Johannes Horner, 2010. "Should Auctions be Transparent?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1764, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Dirk Bergemann & Johannes Horner, 2010. "Should Auctions be Transparent?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1764R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2017.
    • Bergemann, Dirk & Hörner, Johannes, 2010. "Should Auctions Be Transparent?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7989, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Dirk Bergemann & Johannes Horner, 2010. "Should Auctions be Transparent?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1764R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Sep 2014.
13. Perry, Motty & Wolfstetter, Elmar & Zamir, Shmuel, 2000. "A Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 265-273, November.
    • Perry, Motty & Wolfstetter, Elmar & Zamir, Shmuel, 1998. "A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1998,63, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    • Motty Perry & Elmar G. Wolfstetter & Shmuel Zamir, 2000. "A Sealed-Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction," CESifo Working Paper Series 249, CESifo.
14. Fischer, Sven & Guth, Werner & Kaplan, Todd & Zultan, Roi, 2014. "Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation," MPRA Paper 58940, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Todd R. Kaplan & Ro'i Zultan, 2017. "Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation," Jena Economics Research Papers 2017-012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
15. Morath, Florian & Münster, Johannes, 2008. "Private versus complete information in auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 214-216, December.
16. Campbell, Colin & Carare, Octavian & McLean, Richard P., 2005. "Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 95-100, January.
17. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2008. "The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible," Working Papers 2072/13264, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
18. Jihui Chen & Maochao Xu, 2015. "Asymmetry and revenue in second-price auctions: a majorization approach," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 39(3), pages 625-640, July.
19. Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1998. "Auktionen und Ausschreibungen: Bedeutungen und Grenzen des linkage-Prinzips," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1998,31, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
20. Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Todd R. Kaplan & Ro'i Zultan, 2021. "Auctions With Leaks About Early Bids: Analysis And Experimental Behavior," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(2), pages 722-739, April.
21. Guth, Werner & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2005. "Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1891-1913, October.
    • Güth, Werner & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2001. "Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,15, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
22. Fischer, Sven & Guth, Werner & Kaplan, Todd & Zultan, Roi, 2014. "Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation," MPRA Paper 58940, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Sven Fischer & Werner Guth & Todd R. Kaplan & Ro'i Zultan, 2014. "Auctions And Leaks: A Theoretical And Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 1404, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    • Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Todd R. Kaplan & Ro'i Zultan, 2014. "Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation," Jena Economics Research Papers 2014-027, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
23. ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997. "Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
24. Ding, Wei & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2010. "Signal jamming in a sequential auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 58-61, July.
    • Ding, Wei & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2009. "Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 261, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
25. Irene Martínez-Pardina, 2006. "First-price auctions where one of the bidders’ valuations is common knowledge," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(1), pages 31-51, April.
26. A. Alexander Elbittar, 2005. "Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price," Microeconomics 0508008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
27. Cheng, Harrison, 2011. "Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 78-80, April.
28. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2010. "Simple Auctions, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-017, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Apr 2013.