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First-price auctions where one of the bidders’ valuations is common knowledge

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  • Irene Martínez-Pardina

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  • Irene Martínez-Pardina, 2006. "First-price auctions where one of the bidders’ valuations is common knowledge," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(1), pages 31-51, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:1:p:31-51
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-006-0003-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marshall Robert C. & Meurer Michael J. & Richard Jean-Francois & Stromquist Walter, 1994. "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 193-220, September.
    2. Jacob Rubinstein & Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Shmuel Zamir, 2001. "First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(3), pages 461-480.
    3. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    4. Cantillon, Estelle, 2008. "The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-25, January.
    5. Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 125-142, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hsueh, Shao-Chieh & Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Nonratifiability of the Cartel Mechanism in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction with Participation Costs," MPRA Paper 41202, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2010.
    2. Cao, Xiaoyong & Tian, Guoqiang, 2010. "Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 258-273, July.
    3. Charles Thomas, 2011. "The Price Effects of Using Firewalls as an Antitrust Remedy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 38(2), pages 209-222, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric first-price auction; D44; D82; C72; H57;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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