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Evidence Games : Truth and Commitment

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0030, Berlin School of Economics.
  2. Alessandro Ispano & Péter Vida, 2020. "Custodial Interrogations," THEMA Working Papers 2020-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  3. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Pietro Tebaldi, 2019. "Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(3), pages 737-763, October.
  4. S Nageeb Ali & Greg Lewis & Shoshana Vasserman, 2023. "Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(2), pages 538-571.
  5. Frenkel, Sivan & Guttman, Ilan & Kremer, Ilan, 2020. "The effect of exogenous information on voluntary disclosure and market quality," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 176-192.
  6. Cheng Li, 2020. "Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 527-557, April.
  7. , & Frechette, Guilaume & Perego, Jacopo, 2019. "Rules and Commitment in Communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 14085, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2023. "Informed Information Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(11), pages 3186-3232.
  9. Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence reading mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 375-397, October.
  10. Schopohl, Simon, 2019. "Full revelation under optional verification," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 14-16.
  11. Yichuan Lou, 2023. "Private Experimentation, Data Truncation, and Verifiable Disclosure," Papers 2305.04231, arXiv.org.
  12. Kosenko, Andrew & Stiglitz, Joseph & Yun, Jungyoll, 2023. "Bilateral information disclosure in adverse selection markets with nonexclusive competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 144-168.
  13. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid, 2020. "Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1631-1660, July.
  14. Lichtig, Avi & Weksler, Ran, 2023. "Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
  15. Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
  16. Sumit Goel & Wade Hann-Caruthers, 2020. "Project selection with partially verifiable information," Papers 2007.00907, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
  17. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3709dm0u7h9t9qlfe9vrqtn8ed is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Guillaume R. Fréchette & Alessandro Lizzeri & Jacopo Perego, 2022. "Rules and Commitment in Communication: An Experimental Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2283-2318, September.
  19. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2019. "Strategic communication with reporting costs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 341-363, October.
  20. Li, Run, 2021. "Disclosure with unknown expertise," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
  21. Dur, Umut & Hammond, Robert G. & Kesten, Onur, 2021. "Sequential school choice: Theory and evidence from the field and lab," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  22. Ian Ball & Deniz Kattwinkel, 2019. "Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_124, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  23. Evans, R., Reiche, S. & Reiche, S., 2022. "When is a Contrarian Adviser Optimal?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2222, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  24. Raymond Deneckere & Sergei Severinov, 2022. "Signalling, screening and costly misrepresentation," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1334-1370, August.
  25. Bertomeu, Jeremy, 2023. "Managers’ choice of disclosure complexity," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2).
  26. Wu, Jiemai, 2020. "Non-competing persuaders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
  27. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3709dm0u7h9t9qlfe9vrqtn8ed is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Kuvalekar, Aditya & Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2022. "Goodwill in communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
  29. D'Agostino, Elena & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2022. "The order of presentation in trials: Plaintive plaintiffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 328-336.
  30. Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 45, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  31. Avi Lichtig & Helene Mass, 2024. "Optimal Testing in Disclosure Games," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_543, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  32. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2023. "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1051-1067, November.
  33. Shaofei Jiang, 2020. "Equilibrium Refinement in Finite Action Evidence Games," Papers 2007.06403, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
  34. Soumen Banerjee & Yi-Chun Chen, 2022. "Implementation with Uncertain Evidence," Papers 2209.10741, arXiv.org.
  35. Chen, Ying & Oliver, Atara, 2023. "When to ask for an update: Timing in strategic communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
  36. Ian Ball & Deniz Kattwinkel, 2019. "Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design," Papers 1908.05556, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
  37. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.
  38. Alessandro Ispano & Peter Vida, 2021. "Designing Interrogations," THEMA Working Papers 2021-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  39. Shaofei Jiang, 2019. "Disclosure Games with Large Evidence Spaces," Papers 1910.13633, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
  40. Zhou, Junya, 2023. "Costly verification and commitment in persuasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 1100-1142.
  41. Silva, Francisco, 2019. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
  42. repec:ema:worpap:2021-02_v2 is not listed on IDEAS
  43. Xiaoxiao Hu & Haoran Lei, 2022. "The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation," Papers 2208.14829, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
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