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China's Local Political Budget Cycles

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. de Janvry, Alain & He, Guojun & Sadoulet, Elisabeth & Wang, Shaoda & Zhang, Qiong, 2020. "Performance Evaluation, Influence Activities, and Bureaucratic Work Behavior: Evidence from China," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt30z1q8nw, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  2. Fei Guo & Isabel Kit-Ming Yan, 2021. "Fiscal Decentralization and Fiscal Multiplier in China," GRU Working Paper Series GRU_2021_026, City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, Global Research Unit.
  3. Liu, Qijun & Song, Lijie, 2022. "Do intergovernmental transfers boost intergenerational income mobility? Evidence from China," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 293-309.
  4. Meng, Tianguang & Su, Zheng, 2021. "When top-down meets bottom-up: Local officials and selective responsiveness within fiscal policymaking in China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
  5. Palguta, Ján, 2019. "Political representation and public contracting: Evidence from municipal legislatures," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 411-431.
  6. Pi‐Han Tsai & Chien‐Yu Huang & Tsun‐Feng Chiang, 2020. "Fiscal Expenditure And Industrial Land Price In China: Theory And Evidence," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(4), pages 593-606, October.
  7. Oleg Sidorkin & Dmitriy Vorobyev, 2020. "Extra votes to signal loyalty: regional political cycles and national elections in Russia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 183-213, October.
  8. Qi, Yu & Yin, Aoxue & Chen, Jianwei & Yang, Chunfei & Zhan, Pengyu, 2024. "Motivating for environmental protection: Evidence from county officials in China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
  9. Köhler, Ekkehard & Matsusaka, John G. & Wu, Yanhui, 2023. "Street-level responsiveness of city governments in China, Germany, and the United States," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 640-652.
  10. Jingxia Chai & Yu Hao & Haitao Wu & Yuemiao Yang, 2021. "Do constraints created by economic growth targets benefit sustainable development? Evidence from China," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(8), pages 4188-4205, December.
  11. Chen, Shuo & Qiao, Xue & Zhu, Zhitao, 2021. "Chasing or cheating? Theory and evidence on China's GDP manipulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 657-671.
  12. Shen, Shiran V & Wang, Qi & Zhang, Bing, 2023. "Regularized Campaigns as a New Institution for Effective Governance," Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Working Paper Series qt0d83b2rw, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California.
  13. Zhang, Wen, 2020. "Political incentives and local government spending multiplier: Evidence for Chinese provinces (1978–2016)," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 59-71.
  14. Cai, Meina & Liu, Pengfei & Wang, Hui, 2020. "Political trust, risk preferences, and policy support: A study of land-dispossessed villagers in China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
  15. Zhang, Mengtao & Chen, Wenchuan & Kou, Aidi & Wu, Yanjun, 2023. "Promotion incentives, tenure uncertainty, and local government debt risk," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
  16. Junxue Jia & Jing Ning & Jing Zhang, 2023. "Information transparency, monitoring, and incentives under decentralization: Evidence from China's fiscal reform of “province managing county”," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 263-289, March.
  17. Yu Bai & Yanjun Li, 2022. "Political tournaments and regional growth‐enhancing policies: Evidence from Chinese prefectures," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(5), pages 1358-1385, November.
  18. Lin, Xiaowei & Chen, Sicen & Cheng, Xin & Wang, Jinmei, 2022. "Local government audit and municipal debt risk: Evidence from audit reform in China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
  19. Chen, Qianmiao & Huang, Qingyang & Liu, Chang & Wang, Peng, 2022. "Career incentives of local leaders and crisis response: A case study of COVID-19 lockdowns in China," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
  20. Yao, Yao & Li, Xue & Smyth, Russell & Zhang, Lin, 2022. "Air pollution and political trust in local government: Evidence from China," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
  21. Jackie Zheng Yan & Sea‐Jin Chang, 2018. "The contingent effects of political strategies on firm performance: A political network perspective," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(8), pages 2152-2177, August.
  22. Fi̇li̇z Eryilmaz & Mehmet Mercan, 2015. "Political Budget Cycles: Evidence From Turkey," Annals - Economy Series, Constantin Brancusi University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 2, pages 5-14, April.
  23. Lu, Wenyi & Zhuang, Shilong & Fan, Siyuan, 2024. "Losing trust when pursuing development: How automation hindered political trust in China?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 218(C), pages 406-422.
  24. Jing Wu & Hao Li & Keyang Li, 2020. "Local political chief turnover and economic growth: Evidence from China," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 28(3), pages 441-466, July.
  25. Liu, Jianhua & Liu, Jingjun & Tang, Zhenyang & Xu, Yue, 2024. "Provincial economic growth and firm excess investment: Evidence from China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
  26. Rohan Chinchwadkar, 2020. "Political Business Cycles, Elections and Entrepreneurial Finance: A Framework," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 18(4), pages 941-954, December.
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