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The Loan Size as a Commitment Device
Citations
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Cited by:
- Anna Maria Cristina Menichini, 2003. "Separation of functions, Collusion and Supervisors Financial Participation," CSEF Working Papers 109, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée, 2006.
"Incentives For Corruptible Auditors In The Absence Of Commitment,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 269-291, June.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2004. "Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment," Working Papers UWEC-2003-02-FC, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2006. "Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment," Working Papers UWEC-2005-09-P, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2006. "Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/245733, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Picard, Pierre, 2009.
"Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 893-919, July.
- P. Picard, 2002. "Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets," THEMA Working Papers 2002-30, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Ensar Yilmaz & Burak Ünveren, 2012. "Capital regulation and auditing," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(10), pages 1467-1475, October.
- Wai‐Hong Ho & Yong Wang, 2013. "Asymmetric Information, Auditing Commitment, and Economic Growth," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 46(2), pages 611-633, May.
- Anne Villamil & Stefan Krasa & Tridib Sharma, 2004. "Enforcement and Firm Finance," 2004 Meeting Papers 868, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Khalil, Fahad & Martimort, David & Parigi, Bruno, 2007.
"Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 35-67, July.
- Khalil, Fahad & Martimort, David & Parigi, Bruno M., 2004. "Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting," IDEI Working Papers 321, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Fahad Khalil & Bruno Parigi & David Martimort, 2007. "Monitoring a Common Agent: implications for financial contracting," Working Papers UWEC-2003-04-P, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Fahad Khalil & David Martimort & Bruno Maria Parigi, 2005. "Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting," CESifo Working Paper Series 1514, CESifo.
- Karel Janda, 2004. "Bankruptcy Procedures with Ex Post Moral Hazard," Working Papers IES 61, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2004.
- Gregory Phelan, 2017.
"Correlated Default and Financial Intermediation,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(3), pages 1253-1284, June.
- Gregory Phelan, 2015. "Correlated Default and Financial Intermediation," Department of Economics Working Papers 2015-01, Department of Economics, Williams College, revised Sep 2016.
- Peter Simmons, "undated". "Mixed Strategies in Simultaneous and Sequential Play of a 2 Player Game," Discussion Papers 03/07, Department of Economics, University of York.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/6457 is not listed on IDEAS
- Anna Maria Menichini & Peter Simmons, 2014.
"Sorting the good guys from bad: on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(2), pages 339-376, October.
- Annamaria Menichini & Peter Simmons, 2008. "Sorting the Good Guys from Bad: On the Optimality of Deterministic Audit with Ex-Ante Information Acquisition," CSEF Working Papers 201, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 27 Oct 2012.
- Samaresh Bardhan & Vivekananda Mukherjee, 2013. "Willful Default In Developing Country Banking System: A Theoretical Exercise," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 38(4), pages 101-121, December.
- M. Boyer, 2003.
"Contracting under ex post moral hazard and non-commitment,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(1), pages 1-38, August.
- M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Contracting under Ex Post Moral Hazard and Non-Commitment," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-30, CIRANO.
- Nicolas Boccard, 2001. "Financing Start-ups: Advising vs. Competing," CSEF Working Papers 64, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Nielsen, Carsten Krabbe, 2015.
"The loan contract with costly state verification and subjective beliefs,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 89-105.
- Carsten Krabbe Nielsen, 2009. "The Loan Contract with Costly State Verification and Subjective Beliefs," Discussion Paper Series 0918, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- Leandro Arozamena & Martin Besfamille & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2010. "Optimal taxes and penalties when the government cannot commit to its audit policy," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-10, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
- Gaia Garino & Peter Simmons, 2006. "Costly State Verification with Varying Risk Preferences and Liability," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 71-110, February.
- M. Martin Boyer, 2004. "Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of Ex Post Moral Hazard," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 71(4), pages 559-582, December.
- Anna Maria C. Menichini & Peter J. Simmons, 2017. "Efficient audits by pooling projects," Discussion Papers 17/19, Department of Economics, University of York.
- M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Project Financing when the Principal Cannot Commit," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-29, CIRANO.
- Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2014. "Upfront versus staged financing: the role of verifiability," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 1069-1078, June.
- Annamaria Menichini, 2000. "Third parties as an incentive to comply," CSEF Working Papers 41, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jan 2006.
- Hans Hvide & Tore Leite, 2010.
"Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(1), pages 149-165, July.
- Hvide, Hans K. & Leite, Tore, 2007. "Optimal Debt Contracts under Costly Enforcement," CEPR Discussion Papers 6040, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Vauhkonen, Jukka, 2003. "Are adverse selection models of debt robust to changes in market structure?," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 28/2003, Bank of Finland.
- Peitz, Martin & Shin, Dongsoo, 2015. "Capital-labor distortions in project finance," Working Papers 15-01, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
- Finkle, Aaron & Shin, Dongsoo, 2007. "Conducting inaccurate audits to commit to the audit policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 379-389, April.
- David Alary & Christian Gollier, 2004. "Debt Contract, Strategic Default, and Optimal Penalties with Judgement Errors," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 5(2), pages 357-372, November.
- Anna Maria C. Menichini, 2008. "Third Parties, Information Disclosure And Monitoring Incentives," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(1), pages 31-50, February.
- WaiHong Ho & Yong Wang, 2013.
"Asymmetric Information, Auditing Commitment, and Economic Growth,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 46(2), pages 611-633, May.
- Ho, Wai-Hong & Wang, Yong, 2008. "Asymmetric Information, Auditing Commitment and Economic Growth," MPRA Paper 17469, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Heiko Gerlach, 2013. "Self-Reporting, Investigation, and Evidentiary Standards," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 1061-1090.
- Elisabetta Mafrolla & Viola Nobili, 2017. "Discretionary Accruals in Italian Private Firms and Non-Linear Bank Loan Granting," FINANCIAL REPORTING, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2017(1), pages 83-99.
- Karel Janda, 2007. "Optimal Debt Contracts in Emerging Markets with Multiple Investors," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2007(2), pages 115-129.
- M. Martin Boyer & Pierre-Thomas Léger, 2001. "Inflation as a Strategic Response," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-26, CIRANO.
- Peter J. Simmons & Nongnuch Tantisantiwong, 2022. "The Socially Optimal Loan Auditing with Multiple Projects," Discussion Papers 22/07, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Annamaria Menichini & Peter Simmons, 2001. "Are two investors better than one?," CSEF Working Papers 71, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Ahn, Sungyoon & Choi, Wooseok, 2009. "The role of bank monitoring in corporate governance: Evidence from borrowers' earnings management behavior," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 425-434, February.
- Martin Peitz & Dongsoo Shin, 2020. "Distorted Input Ratios in Vertical Relationships," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(4), pages 1480-1509, October.
- Ozgur Arslan-Ayaydin & Darold Barnum & Mehmet Baha Karan & Atilla Hakan Ozdemir, 2014. "How is Moral Hazard Related to Financing R&D and Innovations?," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(4), pages 111-131.
- A. Menichini & P. Simmons, "undated". "Can Liars Ever Prosper," Discussion Papers 02/10, Department of Economics, University of York.