Optimal Debt Contracts in Emerging Markets with Multiple Investors
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DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.301
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Cited by:
- Karel Janda & Jakub Rojcek, 2012. "Bankruptcy Triggering Asset Value - Continuous Time Finance Approach," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2012-581, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Karel Janda, 2009. "Bankruptcies With Soft Budget Constraint," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(4), pages 430-460, July.
- Karel Janda & Eva Michalíková & Věra Potácelová, 2010. "Gravitační a fiskální modely státní podpory exportních úvěrů v České republice [Gravity and Fiscal Models of Government Support of Export Credit in the Czech Republic]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2010(3), pages 305-325.
- Martin Dòzsa & Karel Janda, 2015. "Corporate asset pricing models and debt contracts," CAMA Working Papers 2015-33, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
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More about this item
Keywords
emerging markets; debt; Multiple Lenders; Supply Chains;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
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