IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/the/publsh/1558.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

A theory of school choice lotteries

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Wonki Jo Cho & Battal Doğan, 2017. "Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 991-1014, November.
  2. Aziz, Haris & Brandl, Florian, 2022. "The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 168-187.
  3. Schlegel, Jan Christoph & Mamageishvili, Akaki, 2020. "Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 62-81.
  4. Erdil, Aytek, 2014. "Strategy-proof stochastic assignment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 146-162.
  5. Clayton Featherstone & Muriel Niederle, 2008. "Ex Ante Efficiency in School Choice Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation," NBER Working Papers 14618, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2016. "Ex-Ante Stable Lotteries," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 16.23, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
  7. Neme, Pablo & Oviedo, Jorge, 2021. "On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 1-13.
  8. Balbuzanov, Ivan, 2022. "Constrained random matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
  9. Haris Aziz & Florian Brandl, 2020. "The Vigilant Eating Rule: A General Approach for Probabilistic Economic Design with Constraints," Papers 2008.08991, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
  10. Onur Kesten & Morimitsu Kurino & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2017. "Efficient lottery design," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 31-57, January.
  11. Doğan, Battal & Yıldız, Kemal, 2016. "Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 47-58.
  12. Duddy, Conal, 2017. "The structure of priority in the school choice problem," MPRA Paper 81057, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Juárez, Noelia & Neme, Pablo & Oviedo, Jorge, 2022. "Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 255-273.
  14. Vergote, W., 2015. "One-to-One Matching Problems with Location Restrictions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2015054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-1978, December.
  16. Fuhito Kojima & M. Utku Ünver, 2010. "The 'Boston' School-Choice Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 729, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 08 Oct 2010.
  17. Han, Xiang, 2024. "On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
  18. Tommy ANDERSSON & Ágnes CSEH & Lars EHLERS & Albin ERLANSON, 2018. "Organizing Time Banks : Lessons from Matching Markets," Cahiers de recherche 11-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  19. Antonio Miralles, "undated". "Pseudomarkets with Priorities in Large Random Assignment Economies," Working Papers 537, Barcelona School of Economics.
  20. Harless, Patrick, 2019. "Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 107-116.
  21. Chao Huang, 2023. "Concave many-to-one matching," Papers 2309.04181, arXiv.org.
  22. Fedor Sandomirskiy & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2019. "Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing," Papers 1908.01669, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
  23. Fuhito Kojima & M. Ünver, 2014. "The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 515-544, April.
  24. Schlegel, J. C. & Mamageishvili, A., 2017. "Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities," Working Papers 17/05, Department of Economics, City University London.
  25. Elias Bouacida & Renaud Foucart, 2020. "The acceptability of lotteries in allocation problems," Working Papers 301646245, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  26. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2018. "The object allocation problem with random priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 71-89.
  27. Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed, 2020. "Optimizing for Distributional Goals in School Choice Problems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(8), pages 3657-3676, August.
  28. Wouter Vergote, 2019. "Revisiting stability in one-to-one matching problems," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(1), pages 59-75, May.
  29. Günnur Ege Bilgin, 2024. "Decentralized Many-to-One Matching With Random Search," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_541, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  30. Haris Aziz & Bettina Klaus, 2017. "Random Matching under Priorities: Stability and No Envy Concepts," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 17.09, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  31. Haris Aziz & Bettina Klaus, 2019. "Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(2), pages 213-259, August.
  32. , Emin & , Bumin & , Ali, 2013. "Effective affirmative action in school choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
  33. Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2018. "A note on ex-ante stable lotteries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 90-93.
  34. Hashimoto, Tadashi & Hirata, Daisuke & Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu & Unver, Utku, 2014. "Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  35. Manjunath, Vikram, 2016. "Fractional matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 321-336.
  36. Elias Bouacida & Renaud Foucart, 2022. "Rituals of Reason," Working Papers 344119591, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  37. Schlegel, J. C., 2017. "A Note on Ex-Ante Stable Lotteries," Working Papers 17/06, Department of Economics, City University London.
  38. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match," NBER Working Papers 14864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  39. Cho, Wonki Jo & Hafalir, Isa E. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2022. "Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
  40. Andrew McLennan & Shino Takayama & Yuki Tamura, 2024. "An Efficient, Computationally Tractable School Choice Mechanism," Discussion Papers Series 668, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  41. Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2019. "Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 120-143.
  42. Liao, Cong & Scheuer, Bronte & Dai, Teqi & Tian, Yuan, 2020. "Optimizing the spatial assignment of schools to reduce both inequality of educational opportunity and potential opposition rate through introducing random mechanism into proximity-based system," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.