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Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments
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Cited by:
- Bochet, Olivier, 2007.
"Switching from complete to incomplete information,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 735-748, August.
- Bochet, O.L.A., 2005. "Switching from complete to incomplete information," Research Memorandum 037, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- BOCHET, Olivier, 2005. "Switching from complete to incomplete information," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005063, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 113-123, January.
- Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2007.
"Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(1), pages 85-106, September.
- Yamada, Akira & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅 & ヨシハラ, ナオキ, 2006. "Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economics with unequal labor skill," Discussion Paper Series a475, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu, 2002. "Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: applications," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 253-276, December.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011.
"Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results,"
MPRA Paper
28838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅 & ヨシハラ, ナオキ, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," Discussion Paper Series 555, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," CCES Discussion Paper Series 43, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Galbiati, Marco, 2008.
"Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 72-75, July.
- Marco Galbiati, 2006. "Fair Divisions as Attracting Nash Equilibria of Simple Games," Economics Working Papers ECO2006/24, European University Institute.
- Olivier Bochet, 2007.
"Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(2), pages 301-316, October.
- Bochet, O.L.A., 2005. "Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem," Research Memorandum 039, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- BOCHET, Olivier, 2005. "Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu, 2001. "Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 427-444, June.
- Takashi Hayashi & Toyotaka Sakai, 2009. "Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 453-467, November.
- Thomson, William, 2005.
"Divide-and-permute,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 186-200, July.
- William Thomson, 2004. "Divide-and-Permute," RCER Working Papers 510, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Cason, Timothy N. & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko & Yokotani, Konomu, 2004.
"Non-excludable public good experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 81-102, October.
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko & Yokotani, Konomu & Cason, Timothy N., 2002. "Non-Excludable Public Good Experiments," Working Papers 1154, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2003. "Non-Excludable Public Good Experiments," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000027, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Brusco, Sandro & Jackson, Matthew O., 1999.
"The Optimal Design of a Market,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 1-39, September.
- Sandro Brusco & Matthew O. Jackson, 1997. "The Optimal Design of a Market," Microeconomics 9711003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Sandro Brusco, 1997. "The Optimal Design of a Market," Discussion Papers 1186, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999.
"An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
- Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1997. "An Implementation-theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers 273398, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996.
"Toward Natural Implementation,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-980, November.
- Saijo, T. & Tatamitani, Y. & Yamato, T., 1994. "Toward Natural Implementation," ISER Discussion Paper 0340, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Tomas Sjöström, 1994. "Implementation by demand mechanisms," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 343-354, December.
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002.
"Implementation theory,"
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288,
Elsevier.
- Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, Peter, 2021. "Fighting Collusion: An Implementation Theory Approach," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2021/19, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Hassan Benchekroun & Charles Figuières & Mabel Tidball, 2016.
"Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondance via Simple Indirect Mechanisms,"
Working Papers
halshs-01378460, HAL.
- Hassan Benchekroun & Charles Figuières & Mabel Tidball, 2016. "Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondance via Simple Indirect Mechanisms," AMSE Working Papers 1637, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1998.
"Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(6), pages 1353-1388, November.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1997. "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 9711003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002.
"Implementation theory,"
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288
Elsevier.
- Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
- Serrano, Roberto & Shimomura, Ken-Ichi, 1998. "Beyond Nash Bargaining Theory: The Nash Set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 286-307, December.
- repec:cte:werepe:we081207 is not listed on IDEAS
- Roberto Serrano & Ken Ichi Shimomura, 1996. "An axiomatization of the prekernel of nontransferable utility games," Economics Working Papers 167, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Miyagawa, Eiichi, 2002. "Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 292-308, November.
- Christopher P. Chambers & Takashi Hayashi, 2017. "Resource allocation with partial responsibilities for initial endowments," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 13(4), pages 355-368, December.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2012. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents," Discussion Paper Series 561, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Roberto Serrano, 2003.
"The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules,"
Working Papers
2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Guoqiang Tian, 2010. "Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(1), pages 163-184, March.
- Segal, Ilya, 2007. "The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 341-378, September.
- Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehiko Yamato & Konomu Yokotani, 2003. "Non-Excludable Public Good Experiments revised October 2003, forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior," Discussion papers 03011, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
- Takeshi Suzuki, 2009. "Natural implementation in public goods economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(4), pages 647-664, November.
- Jianxin Yi, 2021. "Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 279-288, September.