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Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills

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  • Akira Yamada
  • Naoki Yoshihara

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  • Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2007. "Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(1), pages 85-106, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:1:p:85-106
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-007-0072-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December.
    2. Kaplan, Todd R & Wettstein, David, 2000. "Surplus Sharing with a Two-State Mechanism," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(2), pages 399-409, May.
    3. Fleurbaey, Marc & Maniquet, Francois, 1996. "Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The No Envy approach to compensation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 71-93, August.
    4. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1999. "Characterizing Natural Implementability: The Fair and Walrasian Correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 271-293, August.
    5. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    6. Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2008. "Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(4), pages 253-270, February.
    7. Hong, Lu, 1995. "Nash Implementation in Production Economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(3), pages 401-417, May.
    8. Roemer John E. & Silvestre Joaquim, 1993. "The Proportional Solution for Economies with Both Private and Public Ownership," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 426-444, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Naoki Yoshihara & Akira Yamada, 2019. "Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(1), pages 113-134, June.
    2. Takashi Hayashi, 2020. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency in labour production economy with unequal skills," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 221-232, April.
    3. Kaname Miyagishima, 2015. "Implementability and equity in production economies with unequal skills," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(3), pages 247-257, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Labor sovereignty; Triple implementation; Different labor skills; C72; D51; D78; D82;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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