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Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations

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  • Tian, Guoqiang

Abstract

This paper considers Nash implementation and double implementation of Pareto efficient allocations for production economies. We allow production sets and preferences are unknown to the planner. We present a well-behaved mechanism that fully implements Pareto efficient allocations in Nash equilibrium. The mechanism then is modified to fully doubly implement Pareto efficient allocations in Nash and strong Nash equilibria. The mechanisms constructed in the paper have many nice properties such as feasibility and continuity. In addition, they use finite-dimensional message spaces. Furthermore, the mechanism works not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies.

Suggested Citation

  • Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 113-123, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:1-2:p:113-123
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    Cited by:

    1. Guoqiang Tian, 2010. "Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(1), pages 163-184, March.
    2. Anuphak Saosaovaphak & Chukiat Chaiboonsri & Satawat O. Wannapan, 2022. "The Perspective of Balancing the Economic Growth of Healthcare Systems and Environmental Prevention: The Efficient Budget for ASEAN-3 Countries," International Journal of Asian Business and Information Management (IJABIM), IGI Global, vol. 13(2), pages 1-26, August.

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