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An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives
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Cited by:
- William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Preference Evolution, Two-Speed Dynamics, and Rapid Social Change," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(3), pages 637-679, July.
- Haile, Daniel & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & Verbon, Harrie A.A., 2008.
"Self-serving dictators and economic growth,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 573-586, September.
- Daniel Haile & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Harrie A. A Verbon, 2003. "Self-Serving Dictators and Economic Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 1105, CESifo.
- Haile, D. & Sadrieh, A. & Verbon, H.A.A., 2003. "Self-Serving Dictators and Economic Growth," Other publications TiSEM dd0c1786-21e1-4383-8ac1-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Haile, D. & Sadrieh, A. & Verbon, H.A.A., 2003. "Self-Serving Dictators and Economic Growth," Discussion Paper 2003-120, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Gary Bolton & Jordi Brandts & Axel Ockenfels, 1998.
"Measuring Motivations for the Reciprocal Responses Observed in a Simple Dilemma Game,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(3), pages 207-219, December.
- Bolton, G.E. & Brandts, J. & Ockenfels, A., 1997. "Measuring Motivations for the Reciprocal Responses Observed in a Simple Dilemma Game," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 400.97, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Ingela Alger & Laurent Lehmann, 2023.
"Evolution of Semi-Kantian Preferences in Two-Player Assortative Interactions with Complete and Incomplete Information and Plasticity,"
Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 1288-1319, December.
- Alger, Ingela & Lehmann, Laurent, 2023. "Evolution of semi-Kantian preferences in two-player assortative interactions with complete and incomplete information and plasticity," TSE Working Papers 23-1405, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised May 2023.
- Ingela Alger & Laurent Lehmann, 2023. "Evolution of semi-kantian preferences in two-player assortative interactions with complete and incomplete information and plasticity," Post-Print hal-04378838, HAL.
- Alger, Ingela & Lehmann, Laurent, 2023. "Evolution of semi-Kantian preferences in two-player assortative interactions with complete and incomplete information and plasticity," IAST Working Papers 23-148, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), revised May 2023.
- Laurent Lehmann & Ingela Alger, 2023. "Evolution of semi-Kantian preferences in two-player assortative interactions with complete and incomplete information and plasticity," Working Papers hal-04141955, HAL.
- Dufwenberg, M. & Güth, W., 1997.
"Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation : A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions,"
Other publications TiSEM
5e16a5c7-9a69-467f-b00a-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Güth, Werner, 1998. "Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Working Paper Series 1998:9, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Dufwenberg, M. & Guth, W., 1998. "Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Papers 1998-09, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
- Dufwenberg, M. & Güth, W., 1997. "Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation : A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Discussion Paper 1997-12, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Güth, Werner, 1997. "Indirect evolution versus strategic delegation: A comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1997,28, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Fehr, Ernst & Kirchler, Erich & Weichbold, Andreas & Gächter, Simon, 1998. "When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 324-351, April.
- Anders Poulsen & Gert Svendsen, 2005. "Social Capital and Endogenous Preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 171-196, April.
- Chung-cheng Lin & C.C. Yang, 2006. "Receiprocity and Downward Wage Rigidity," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 06-A015, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
- Herold, Florian, 2003. "Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences," Discussion Papers in Economics 40, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Werner Güth & Stefan Napel, 2006.
"Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514), pages 1037-1056, October.
- Werner Güth & Stefan Napel, "undated". "Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Curtis Eaton & Mukesh Eswaran, 2003.
"The evolution of preferences and competition: a rationalization of Veblen's theory of invidious comparisons,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(4), pages 832-859, November.
- B. Curtis Eaton & Mukesh Eswaran, 2003. "The evolution of preferences and competition: a rationalization of Veblen's theory of invidious comparisons," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(4), pages 832-859, November.
- Burkhard C. Schipper, 2021.
"The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 417-454, May.
- Schipper, Burkhard C., 2005. "The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 35/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Burkhard C. Schipper, 2019. "The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism, and Complete Ignorance," Working Papers 334, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Schipper, Burkhard C., 2005. "The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 68, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Ed Hopkins Jr., 2014.
"Competitive Altruism, Mentalizing, and Signaling,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 272-292, November.
- Hopkins, Ed, 2010. "Competitive Altruism, Mentalizing and Signalling," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-90, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Ed Hopkins, 2010. "Competitive Altruism, Mentalizing and Signalling," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 197, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Friederike Mengel & Axel Ockenfels & Werner Güth, 2006. "The Dynamics of Trust and Trustworthiness on EBay. An Evolutionary Analysis of Buyer Insurance and Seller Reputation," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-03, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Werner Güth & Friederike Mengel & Axel Ockenfels, 2007. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Buyer Insurance and Seller Reputation in Online Markets," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 265-282, November.
- Thomas Norman, 2004. "Dynamically Stable Preferences," Economics Series Working Papers 207, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Martin Dufwenberg & Werner Guth, 2003. "Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000789, David K. Levine.
- Martin Dufwenberg & Werner Gueth, 2001. "The Psychological Game of Trust," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-19, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Christian Ewerhart, 2006.
"The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Outcome of Alternating-Offers Bargaining Between Inequity-Averse Agents,"
Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 58(2), pages 184-203, April.
- Christian Ewerhart, "undated". "The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Outcome of Alternating-Offers Bargaining between Inequity-Averse Agents," IEW - Working Papers 203, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Gary Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2005.
"A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(4), pages 957-982, June.
- Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-29, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Timur Kuran & William H. Sandholm, 2008.
"Cultural Integration and Its Discontents,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(1), pages 201-228.
- Kuran,T. & Sandholm,W.H., 2002. "Cultural integration and its discontents," Working papers 20, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Mauricio G. Villena & Marcelo J. Villena, 2004.
"Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?,"
Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(3), pages 585-610, September.
- Villena, Mauricio G. & Villena, Marcelo J., 2004. "Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?," MPRA Paper 28889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000.
"Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated". "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo.
- Astrid Gamba, 2011. "On the Evolution of Preferences," Jena Economics Research Papers 2011-032, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- John M McNamara & Alasdair I Houston & Olof Leimar, 2021. "Learning, exploitation and bias in games," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(2), pages 1-14, February.
- Sven Fischer, 2005. "Inequality Aversion in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Conflict Payoffs - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-36, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Wolpert David & Jamison Julian & Newth David & Harre Michael, 2011. "Strategic Choice of Preferences: the Persona Model," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-39, August.
- Wu, Jiabin, 2016. "Political Institutions and Preference Evolution," MPRA Paper 69597, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sandholm,W.H., 1998. "The evolution of preferences and rapid social change," Working papers 28, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Gary Bolton, 1998. "Bargaining and Dilemma Games: From Laboratory Data Towards Theoretical Synthesis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(3), pages 257-281, December.
- Khan, Abhimanyu, 2022. "Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997.
"Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: experimental evidence," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5911, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Gary E Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 1997. "A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1889, David K. Levine.
- Poulsen, A., 2001.
"Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model,"
Papers
01-3, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics.
- Poulsen, Anders, 2001. "Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model," Working Papers 01-3, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Laurence Fiddick & Denise Cummins, 2001. "Reciprocity in Ranked Relationships: Does Social Structure Influence Social Reasoning?," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 149-170, May.
- Alvaro Sandroni, 1997. "Reciprosity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Blurry Belief Approach," Discussion Papers 1200, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Driving Forces of Informal Sanctions," IEW - Working Papers 059, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2001. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000143, David K. Levine.
- Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
- von Widekind, Sven, 2011. "Evolution of non-expected utility preferences," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 370, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Spichtig, Mathias & Traxler, Christian, 2007. "Social Norms and the Evolution of Conditional Cooperation," Discussion Papers in Economics 1398, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Maria Vittoria Levati, "undated". "Explaining Private Provision of Public Goods by Conditional Cooperation - An Evoltuionary Approach -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-44, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.