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Penalty has no Impact on Crime:

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Patrick Groeber & Heiko Rauhut, 2010. "Does ignorance promote norm compliance?," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 1-28, March.
  2. Luciano Andreozzi, 2008. "Inspection games with long-run inspectors," Department of Economics Working Papers 0821, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  3. Sheopuri, Anshul & Zemel, Eitan, 2010. "A note on the properties of the optimal solution(s) of the Greed and Regret problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 204(3), pages 690-693, August.
  4. Jack Hirshleifer & Eric Rasmusen, 1992. "Are Equilibrium Strategies Unaffected by Incentives?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(3), pages 353-367, July.
  5. Guido Mehlkop & Peter Graeff, 2010. "Modelling a rational choice theory of criminal action: Subjective expected utilities, norms, and interactions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 22(2), pages 189-222, May.
  6. George Tsebelis, 1993. "Penalty and Crime: Further Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(3), pages 349-374, July.
  7. George Tsebelis, 1995. "Another Response to Gordon Tullock," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(1), pages 97-99, January.
  8. Rimawan Pradiptyo, 2015. "A Certain Uncertainty; Assessment of Court Decisions in Tackling Corruption in Indonesia," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: R N Ghosh & M A B Siddique (ed.), CORRUPTION, GOOD GOVERNANCE and ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Contemporary Analysis and Case Studies, chapter 10, pages 167-215, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  9. Tóth, István János & Szántó, Zoltán, 2001. "A rejtett gazdaság és az ellene való fellépés tényezői [The hidden economy and the factors involved in combating it]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 203-218.
  10. Franz Weissing & Elinor Ostrom, 1991. "Crime and Punishment: Further Reflections on the Counterintuitive Results of Mixed Equilibria Games," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(3), pages 343-350, July.
  11. Josef Schosser & Jochen Wilhelm, 2018. "Costly state verification and truthtelling: a note on the theory of debt contracts," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(2), pages 129-139, October.
  12. Heiko Rauhut & Marcel Junker, 2009. "Punishment Deters Crime Because Humans Are Bounded in Their Strategic Decision-Making," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 12(3), pages 1-1.
  13. Susumu Shikano & Michael F Stoffel & Markus Tepe, 2017. "Information accuracy in legislative oversight: Theoretical implications and experimental evidence," Rationality and Society, , vol. 29(2), pages 226-254, May.
  14. Lu Gram & Rolando Granados & Eva M. Krockow & Nayreen Daruwalla & David Osrin, 2021. "Modelling collective action to change social norms around domestic violence: social dilemmas and the role of altruism," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 8(1), pages 1-15, December.
  15. Dean A. Shepherd & Vinit Parida & Joakim Wincent, 2021. "Bribery from a micro, demand-side perspective," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 57(4), pages 1661-1680, December.
  16. Heiko Rauhut, 2015. "Stronger inspection incentives, less crime? Further experimental evidence on inspection games," Rationality and Society, , vol. 27(4), pages 414-454, November.
  17. Fenling Feng & Chengguang Liu & Jiaqi Zhang, 2020. "China's Railway Transportation Safety Regulation System Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(10), pages 1944-1966, October.
  18. Christine Horne & Heiko Rauhut, 2013. "Using laboratory experiments to study law and crime," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 1639-1655, April.
  19. Guzmán, Cristóbal & Riffo, Javiera & Telha, Claudio & Van Vyve, Mathieu, 2022. "A sequential Stackelberg game for dynamic inspection problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 302(2), pages 727-739.
  20. Roger Waldeck, 2016. "Modeling criminality: the impact of emotions, norms and interaction structures," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 135-160, June.
  21. Christine Horne & Heiko Rauhut, "undated". "Using Laboratory Experiments to Study Law and Crime," Working Papers CCSS-10-010, ETH Zurich, Chair of Systems Design.
  22. Tibor Bosse & Charlotte Gerritsen, 2010. "Social Simulation and Analysis of the Dynamics of Criminal Hot Spots," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 13(2), pages 1-5.
  23. Guzman, Cristobal & Riffo, Javiera & Telha, Claudio & Van Vyve, Mathieu, 2021. "A Sequential Stackelberg Game for Dynamic Inspection Problems," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2021036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  24. Heiko Rauhut, 2009. "Higher Punishment, Less Control?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 21(3), pages 359-392, August.
  25. Berno Buechel & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2016. "Black Sheep or Scapegoats? Implementable Monitoring Policies under Unobservable Levels of Misbehavior," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 331-366.
  26. Daniel G. Arce, 2018. "On the cooperative and competitive aspects of strategic monitoring," Rationality and Society, , vol. 30(3), pages 377-390, August.
  27. Bolle, Friedel, 2014. "On a class of threshold public goods games: With applications to voting and the Kyoto Protocol," Discussion Papers 345, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
  28. Laurent Franckx, 2004. "Penalty and Crime with Lumpy Choices," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(4), pages 403-421, October.
  29. Leshem Shmuel & Tabbach Avraham D., 2012. "Commitment versus Flexibility in Enforcement Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-42, May.
  30. Gorji, Mohammad-Ali & Shetab-Boushehri, Seyyed-Nader & Akbarzadeh, Meisam, 2023. "Evaluation and improvement of the resilience of a transportation system against epidemic diseases: A system dynamics approach," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 27-44.
  31. Perry, Logan & Gavrilets, Sergey, 2019. "Foresight in a Game of Leadership," SocArXiv 84yxz, Center for Open Science.
  32. Soo-Haeng Cho & Xin Fang & Sridhar Tayur & Ying Xu, 2019. "Combating Child Labor: Incentives and Information Disclosure in Global Supply Chains," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 21(3), pages 692-711, July.
  33. Gianfranco Gambarelli & Daniele Gervasio & Francesca Maggioni & Daniel Faccini, 2022. "A Stackelberg game for the Italian tax evasion problem," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 295-307, June.
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