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Are Mutual Funds Active Voters?

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Ilya Ivaninskiy & Irina Ivashkovskaya & Joseph A. McCahery, 2023. "Does digitalization mitigate or intensify the principal-agent conflict in a firm?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 27(3), pages 695-725, September.
  2. Aggarwal, Reena & Dahiya, Sandeep & Prabhala, Nagpurnanand R., 2019. "The power of shareholder votes: Evidence from uncontested director elections," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 134-153.
  3. Berno Buechel & Lydia Mechtenberg & Alexander F. Wagner, 2022. "When do proxy advisors improve corporate decisions?," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 22-47, Swiss Finance Institute.
  4. Gow, Ian D. & Larcker, David F. & Watts, Edward M., 2023. "Board diversity and shareholder voting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
  5. Artiga González, Tanja & Calluzzo, Paul & Granic, Georg D., 2023. "Ballot order effects in independent director elections," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C).
  6. Bing Guo & Dennis C. Hutschenreiter & David Pérez-Castrillo & Anna Toldrà-Simats, 2023. "Institutional Blockholders and Corporate Innovation," Working Papers 1390, Barcelona School of Economics.
  7. Nadya Malenko & Yao Shen, 2016. "The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(12), pages 3394-3427.
  8. Duan, Ying & Jiao, Yawen & Tam, Kinsun, 2021. "Conflict of interest and proxy voting by institutional investors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
  9. Jiekun Huang, 2023. "Thy Neighbor’s Vote: Peer Effects in Proxy Voting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(7), pages 4169-4189, July.
  10. Dressler, Efrat, 2020. "Voice and power: Do institutional shareholders make use of their voting power?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
  11. Dasgupta, Amil & Fos, Vyacheslav & Sautner, Zacharias, 2021. "Institutional investors and corporate governance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112114, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  12. Lesmeister, Simon & Limbach, Peter & Goergen, Marc, 2022. "Trust and monitoring," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
  13. Loureiro, Gilberto & Mendonça, Cesar, 2024. "Do large registered investment funds undermine shareholder activism? Evidence from hedge fund proposals," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
  14. Miyachi, Hiroaki & Takeda, Fumiko, 2024. "Empirical study on voting results and proxy advisor recommendations in Japan," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
  15. Calluzzo, Paul & Kedia, Simi, 2019. "Mutual fund board connections and proxy voting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(3), pages 669-688.
  16. Xue, Xiaolin & Zhang, Junrui & Yu, Yangxin, 2020. "Distracted passive institutional shareholders and firm transparency," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 347-359.
  17. Field, Laura Casares & Lowry, Michelle, 2022. "Bucking the trend: Why do IPOs choose controversial governance structures and why do investors let them?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 27-54.
  18. Anisa Safiah Maznorbalia & Muhammad Aiman Awalluddin & Ardzlyn Hawatul Yuhanis Ayob, 2023. "Exploring the role of institutional investors in voting, monitoring and dialogue engagement in mitigating agency conflict in Malaysia’s public listed companies," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-9, December.
  19. Cvijanović, Dragana & Dasgupta, Amil & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2022. "The Wall Street stampede: Exit as governance with interacting blockholders," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 433-455.
  20. Isil Erel & Léa H Stern & Chenhao Tan & Michael S Weisbach, 2021. "Selecting Directors Using Machine Learning," NBER Chapters, in: Big Data: Long-Term Implications for Financial Markets and Firms, pages 3226-3264, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Kiesewetter, Dirk & Manthey, Johannes, 2017. "The relationship between corporate governance and tax avoidance - evidence from Germany using a regression discontinuity design," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 218, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
  22. Wang, Xianjue, 2021. "Disclosure by firms under voting pressure," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
  23. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Shapiro, Joel, 2020. "Blockholder voting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(3), pages 695-717.
  24. Peter Iliev & Jonathan Kalodimos & Michelle Lowry, 2021. "Investors’ Attention to Corporate Governance [The “Wall Street Walk” and shareholder activism: Exit as a form of voice]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(12), pages 5581-5628.
  25. Hshieh, Shenje & Li, Jiasun & Tang, Yingcong, 2021. "How do passive funds act as active owners? Evidence from mutual fund voting records," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
  26. Efrat Dressler & Yevgeny Mugerman, 2023. "Doing the Right Thing? The Voting Power Effect and Institutional Shareholder Voting," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 183(4), pages 1089-1112, April.
  27. Ian R. Appel & Todd A. Gormley & Donald B. Keim, 2016. "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of Passive Investors on Activism," NBER Working Papers 22707, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  28. Steven Chong Xiao, 2020. "Do Noisy Stock Prices Impede Real Efficiency?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(12), pages 5990-6014, December.
  29. Denes, Matthew R. & Karpoff, Jonathan M. & McWilliams, Victoria B., 2017. "Thirty years of shareholder activism: A survey of empirical research," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 405-424.
  30. He, Yazhou Ellen, 2021. "Communications in proxy contests," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
  31. Edmans, Alex & Gosling, Tom & Jenter, Dirk, 2023. "CEO compensation: Evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(3).
  32. Albina Gibadullina, 2024. "Who owns and controls global capital? Uneven geographies of asset manager capitalism," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 56(2), pages 558-585, March.
  33. Paul M. Guest & Marco Nerino, 2019. "Do Corporate Governance Ratings Change Investor Expectations? Evidence from Announcements by Institutional Shareholder Services," Working Papers wp515, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
  34. Bolton, Patrick & Li, Tao & Ravina, Enrichetta & Rosenthal, Howard, 2020. "Investor ideology," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(2), pages 320-352.
  35. Lee, Choonsik, 2021. "Mitigating information imperfections in proxy contests: The effect of dissidents' proxy solicitation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
  36. Ruf, Tobias, 2023. "Passive ownership and long-term orientation around the world," Junior Management Science (JUMS), Junior Management Science e. V., vol. 8(2), pages 473-504.
  37. Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Antonin Macé & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation," NBER Working Papers 29005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  38. Miller, Steve M. & Moussawi, Rabih & Wang, Bin & Yang, Tina, 2021. "Institutional investors and bank governance: An international analysis of bank earnings management," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
  39. Lan, Ge & Li, Donghui & Yang, Shijie, 2023. "Costs of voting and firm performance: Evidence from RegTech adoption in Chinese listed firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
  40. Steven S. Crawford & Karen K. Nelson & Brian R. Rountree, 2021. "Mind the gap: CEO–employee pay ratios and shareholder say‐on‐pay votes," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1-2), pages 308-337, January.
  41. Jang-Sup Shin, 2018. "The Subversion of Shareholder Democracy and the Rise of Hedge-Fund Activism," Working Papers Series 77, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
  42. Yonca Ertimur & Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, 2018. "Understanding Uncontested Director Elections," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(7), pages 3400-3420, July.
  43. Masumoto, Kazuhide & Takeda, Fumiko, 2022. "Market reactions to proxy advisory companies’ recommendations in Japan," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
  44. Sudipto Dasgupta & Thomas H. Noe, 2019. "Does Pay Activism Pay Off for Shareholders? Shareholder Democracy and Its Discontents," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1810-1832, April.
  45. Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam & Wermers, Russ, 2022. "Do institutional investors monitor their large-scale vs. small-scale investments differently? Evidence from the say-on-pay vote," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
  46. Ormazabal, Gaizka & Jochem, Torsten & Rajamani, Anjana, 2020. "Why Have CEO Pay Levels Become Less Diverse?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15523, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  47. Corum, Adrian Aycan & Malenko, Andrey & Malenko, Nadya, 2020. "Corporate Governance in the Presence of Active and Passive Delegated Investment," OSF Preprints 8n6xj, Center for Open Science.
  48. Choonsik Lee & Matthew E. Souther, 2020. "Managerial Reliance on the Retail Shareholder Vote: Evidence from Proxy Delivery Methods," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(4), pages 1717-1736, April.
  49. Dimmock, Stephen G. & Gerken, William C. & Ivković, Zoran & Weisbenner, Scott J., 2018. "Capital gains lock-in and governance choices," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 113-135.
  50. Appel, Ian R. & Gormley, Todd A. & Keim, Donald B., 2016. "Passive investors, not passive owners," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 111-141.
  51. Shane S. Dikolli & Mary Margaret Frank & Zhe Michael Guo & Luann J. Lynch, 2022. "Walk the talk: ESG mutual fund voting on shareholder proposals," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 864-896, September.
  52. Christie Hayne & Marshall Vance, 2019. "Information Intermediary or De Facto Standard Setter? Field Evidence on the Indirect and Direct Influence of Proxy Advisors," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 969-1011, September.
  53. Ge, Yao & Hung, Shengmin & Huang, Wei & Qiao, Zheng & Deng, Xin, 2023. "Mutual fund herding and audit pricing," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
  54. Chen, Victor Zitian & Hobdari, Bersant & Zhang, Yilei, 2019. "Blockholder heterogeneity and conflicts in cross-border acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 86-101.
  55. Wang, Xianjue, 2022. "Disloyal managers and proxy voting," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
  56. Alan D. Crane & Andrew Koch, 2018. "Shareholder Litigation and Ownership Structure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(1), pages 5-23, January.
  57. Xiaohui Li & Yao Shen & Jing Xie, 2024. "Proxy Voting on CEO Pay: Evidence from Rejection of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine," Working Papers 202412, University of Macau, Faculty of Business Administration.
  58. David, Thomas & Di Giuli, Alberta & Romec, Arthur, 2023. "CEO reputation and shareholder voting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
  59. Massa, Massimo & Žaldokas, Alminas, 2017. "Information transfers among co-owned firms," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 77-92.
  60. Karel Hrazdil & Jeong-Bon Kim & Lijing Tong & Min Zhang, 2022. "How Does Market Competition Affect Shareholder Voting? Evidence from Branching Deregulation in the U.S. Banking Market," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(9), pages 1-23, August.
  61. Farizo, Joseph D., 2022. "(Black)Rock the vote: Index funds and opposition to management," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
  62. Shu, Chong, 2024. "The proxy advisory industry: Influencing and being influenced," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
  63. Gilje, Erik P. & Gormley, Todd A. & Levit, Doron, 2020. "Who's paying attention? Measuring common ownership and its impact on managerial incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 152-178.
  64. Foroughi, Pouyan & Marcus, Alan & Nguyen, Vinh, 2024. "Mutual fund pollution experience and environmental voting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
  65. Tao Li, 2018. "Outsourcing Corporate Governance: Conflicts of Interest Within the Proxy Advisory Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(6), pages 2951-2971, June.
  66. Gine, Mireia & Moussawi, Rabih & Sedunov, John, 2017. "Governance mechanisms and effective activism: Evidence from shareholder proposals on poison pills," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 185-202.
  67. Alessio M. Pacces, 2021. "Will the EU Taxonomy Regulation Foster Sustainable Corporate Governance?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(21), pages 1-21, November.
  68. Abdulaziz A. Alomran & Kholod F. Alsahali, 2023. "The Role of Long-Term Institutional Ownership in Sustainability Report Assurance: Global Evidence," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-17, February.
  69. Tahir Ahmad Wani & Arunima Haldar & Irfan Rashid Ganie, 2023. "In What Contexts Institutional Investors Can Be Catalyst? The Moderating Role of Corporate Governance," International Journal of Global Business and Competitiveness, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 70-79, June.
  70. Brav, Alon & Cain, Matthew & Zytnick, Jonathon, 2022. "Retail shareholder participation in the proxy process: Monitoring, engagement, and voting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 492-522.
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