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Empirical study on voting results and proxy advisor recommendations in Japan

Author

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  • Miyachi, Hiroaki
  • Takeda, Fumiko

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between proxy advisory firms’ recommendations and investors’ voting behavior in Japan, where corporate governance has been under transition. Based on 1,025 shareholder meeting proposals and recommendations by proxy advisory firms in Japan between March 2010 and March 2022, multivariate regression analyses reveal that the dissenting recommendations of the two main proxy advisory firms are negatively correlated with the approval rate of proposals, as well as the percentage of affirmative votes cast by institutional investors. Furthermore, the institutional investors’ behavior is more consistent with the recommendations of proxy advisory firms than that of other investors.

Suggested Citation

  • Miyachi, Hiroaki & Takeda, Fumiko, 2024. "Empirical study on voting results and proxy advisor recommendations in Japan," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:intfin:v:92:y:2024:i:c:s1042443124000398
    DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2024.101973
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Proxy advisory firms; Shareholder voting; Institutional investors; Voting results; Shareholder proposals;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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