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Communications in proxy contests

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  • He, Yazhou Ellen

Abstract

This paper studies the communication of “voice” in shareholder activism. Using hand-collected data, I investigate how the use of investor presentations, among other communication strategies, affects the outcomes of proxy contests. Being the first to make presentations to investors increases the dissident's chance of winning by 60%. To understand this first-mover advantage, I examine the allocation of investor attention and variation in investor sophistication. The evidence is consistent with an explanation of limited investor attention. The findings highlight the role of communication in corporate governance.

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  • He, Yazhou Ellen, 2021. "Communications in proxy contests," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:69:y:2021:i:c:s0929119921001346
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Le Lin & Ke Liao & Deren Xie, 2023. "When Investors Speak, Do Firms Listen? The Role of Investors' Dividend‐related Complaints from Online Earnings Communication Conferences," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 59(1), pages 32-75, March.
    2. Lin, Xiaowei & Huang, Hung-Yi & Lee, Yun-Chi, 2023. "Proxy solicitation, ownership structure, and bank cash dividends," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 15-23.

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