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How do passive funds act as active owners? Evidence from mutual fund voting records

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  • Hshieh, Shenje
  • Li, Jiasun
  • Tang, Yingcong

Abstract

The rise of passive institutional investors in the U.S. stock market raises questions about the governance implications to their portfolio firms. While the existing literature documents positive governance changes when passive institutional ownership displaces retail ownership, it remains unclear how passive institutional ownership approaches corporate governance differently than their active peers. This paper compares the proxy voting behaviors between same-family passive and active mutual funds with identical investment styles. We find that passive funds are not more likely to vote in favor of governance reforms than active funds. We also provide suggestive evidence that besides voting, the influence of passive funds on corporate governance also operates through a “behind the scenes” channel.

Suggested Citation

  • Hshieh, Shenje & Li, Jiasun & Tang, Yingcong, 2021. "How do passive funds act as active owners? Evidence from mutual fund voting records," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:66:y:2021:i:c:s092911992030136x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101692
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