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Is Grameen Lending Efficient? Repayment Incentives and Insurance in Village Economies

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Daniel J. Clarke, 2011. "Reinsuring the Poor: Group Microinsurance Design and Costly State Verification," Economics Series Working Papers 573, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  2. Altınok, Ahmet & Sever, Can, 2014. "Efficient Microlending without Joint Liability," MPRA Paper 56598, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Li Gan & Manuel A. Hernandez & Yanyan Liu, 2018. "Group Lending With Heterogeneous Types," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 895-913, April.
  4. Xavier Gine & Dean Karlan, 2006. "Group versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines," Working Papers 940, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
  5. Dehejia, Rajeev & Montgomery, Heather & Morduch, Jonathan, 2012. "Do interest rates matter? Credit demand in the Dhaka slums," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 437-449.
  6. Ahlin, Christian & Debrah, Godwin, 2022. "Group lending with covariate risk," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
  7. Dhami, Sanjit & Arshad, Junaid & al-Nowaihi, Ali, 2022. "Psychological and social motivations in microfinance contracts: Theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
  8. Sara Biancini & David Ettinger & Baptiste Venet, 2017. "Mission Drift in Microcredit and Microfinance Institution Incentives," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 2017-02, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
  9. Columba, Francesco & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio, 2010. "Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-54, April.
  10. Madestam, Andreas, 2014. "Informal finance: A theory of moneylenders," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 157-174.
  11. Baland, Jean-Marie & Somanathan, Rohini & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2013. "Repayment incentives and the distribution of gains from group lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 131-139.
  12. Fischer, Gregory, 2013. "Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 46796, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  13. Robert Cull & Asli Demirguç-Kunt & Jonathan Morduch, 2007. "Financial performance and outreach: a global analysis of leading microbanks," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(517), pages 107-133, February.
  14. Lutz G. Arnold & Johannes Reeder & Susanne Steger, 2013. "On the Viability of Group Lending when Microfinance Meets the Market," Journal of Emerging Market Finance, Institute for Financial Management and Research, vol. 12(1), pages 59-106, April.
  15. Fujimoto, Junichi & Lee, Junsang, 2020. "Optimal self-financing microfinance contracts when borrowers have risk aversion and limited commitment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 60-79.
  16. Agarwal, Sumit & Ambrose, Brent W. & Chomsisengphet, Souphala & Liu, Chunlin, 2016. "Joint liability lending and credit risk: Evidence from the home equity market," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 47-66.
  17. Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2011. "When is the optimal lending contract in microfinance state non-contingent?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(5), pages 720-731, June.
  18. Brown, J David & Earle, John S & Lup, Dana, 2005. "What Makes Small Firms Grow? Finance, Human Capital, Technical Assistance, and the Business Environment in Romania," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(1), pages 33-70, October.
  19. Sara Biancini & David Ettinger & Baptiste Venet, 2024. "When pro‐poor microcredit institutions favour richer borrowers: A moral hazard story," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(1), pages 225-242, February.
  20. Bardsley, Peter & Meager, Rachael, 2019. "Competing lending platforms, endogenous reputation, and fragility in microcredit markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 107-126.
  21. Kono, Hisaki, 2006. "Is Group Lending A Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving High Repayment Rates?: Evidence from Field Experiments in Vietnam," IDE Discussion Papers 61, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
  22. Shyamal Chowdhury & Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Kunal Sengupta, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Discussion Papers 14-07, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
  23. Czura, Kristina, 2015. "Pay, peek, punish? Repayment, information acquisition and punishment in a microcredit lab-in-the-field experiment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 119-133.
  24. Carli, Francesco & Uras, Burak R., 2017. "Joint-liability with endogenously asymmetric group loan contracts," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 72-90.
  25. Sara Biancini & David Ettinger & Baptiste Venet, 2019. "Mission Drift in Microcredit: A Contract Theory Approach," Working Papers hal-02304352, HAL.
  26. Lutz G. Arnold & Benedikt Booker & Gregor Dorfleitner & Michaela Röhe, 2021. "Refinancing MFIs with market power: theory and evidence," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1485-1505, April.
  27. ZOUARI, Zeineb & NABI, Mahmoud Sami, 2013. "Enhancing the Enforceability of Islamic Microfinance Contracts in OIC countries," MPRA Paper 49816, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  28. Rai, Ashok S. & Klonner, Stefan, 2007. "Cosigners Help," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 18, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
  29. Sara Biancini & David Ettinger & Baptiste Venet, 2021. "When Pro-Poor Microcredit Institutions Favor Richer Borrowers - A Moral Hazard Story," CESifo Working Paper Series 8893, CESifo.
  30. Robert Cull & Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Jonathan Morduch, 2009. "Microfinance meets the market," Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, in: Moving Beyond Storytelling: Emerging Research in Microfinance, pages 1-30, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
  31. Drugov, Mikhail & Macchiavello, Rocco, 2008. "Learning and Microlending," CEPR Discussion Papers 7011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  32. Jonathan de Quidt & Thiemo Fetzer & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2018. "Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(610), pages 1019-1046, May.
  33. Paal, Beatrix & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 30-40, January.
  34. Cao, Bin & Zhong, Yuanguang & Zhou, Yong-Wu, 2024. "The role of completely joint liability in financing multiple capital-constrained firms: Risk sharing, inventory and financial strategies," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(3), pages 1072-1087.
  35. Van Tassel Eric, 2017. "Structuring Subsidies in a Long-Term Credit Relationship," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 17(4), pages 1-12, October.
  36. Xavier Giné & Pamela Jakiela & Dean Karlan & Jonathan Morduch, 2010. "Microfinance Games," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 60-95, July.
  37. Karlan, Dean & Gine, Xavier, 2009. "Group versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups," Working Papers 61, Yale University, Department of Economics.
  38. Bryan, Gharad & Karlan, Dean S. & Zinman, Jonathan, 2012. "You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Need to Watch Them: Loan Screening and Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment," Center Discussion Papers 121674, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
  39. Ahlin, Christian, 2015. "The role of group size in group lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 140-155.
  40. de Quidt, Jonathan & Fetzer, Thiemo & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2016. "Group lending without joint liability," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 217-236.
  41. Peter J. Simmons & Nongnuch Tantisantiwong, 2022. "The Socially Optimal Loan Auditing with Multiple Projects," Discussion Papers 22/07, Department of Economics, University of York.
  42. Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2005. "Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 415-439, August.
  43. Daripa, Arup, 2008. "Optimal collective contract without peer information or peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 147-163, April.
  44. Bond, Philip & Rai, Ashok S., 2008. "Cosigned vs. group loans," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1-2), pages 58-80, February.
  45. repec:cep:stieop:44 is not listed on IDEAS
  46. Mathurin Founanou & Zaka Ratsimalahelo, 2016. "Regulation of Microfinance Institutions in Developing countries: an incentives theory approach," Working Papers hal-01376900, HAL.
  47. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2004. "Group-lending with sequential financing, joint liability and social capital," Discussion Papers 04-23, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
  48. Allen, Treb, 2016. "Optimal (partial) group liability in microfinance lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 201-216.
  49. Chowdhury, Shyamal & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy & Sengupta, Kunal, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 167-180.
  50. DeanS. Karlan, 2007. "Social connections and group banking," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(517), pages 52-84, February.
  51. Bhole, Bharat & Ogden, Sean, 2010. "Group lending and individual lending with strategic default," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 348-363, March.
  52. Ahlin, Christian & Jiang, Neville, 2008. "Can micro-credit bring development?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 1-21, April.
  53. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Maitra, Pushkar, 2012. "Moral hazard and peer monitoring in a laboratory microfinance experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 192-209.
  54. Valentina Hartarska & Steven B. Caudill & Daniel M. Gropper, 2006. "The Cost Structure Of Microfinance Institutions In Eastern Europe And Central Asia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp809, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  55. Flatnes, Jon Einar & Carter, Michael R., 2019. "A little skin in the game: Reducing moral hazard in joint liability lending through a mandatory collateral requirement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 199-214.
  56. Mathurin FOUNANOU & Zaka RATSIMALAHELO, 2016. "Regulation of Microfinance Institutions in Developing countries: an incentives theory approach," Working Papers 2016-03, CRESE.
  57. Karaivanov, Alexander & Xing, Xiaochuan & Xue, Yi, 2020. "Bogus joint liability groups in microfinance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
  58. Abdul Karim, Zulkefly, 2009. "Microfinance and Mechanism Design: The Role of Joint Liability and Cross-Reporting," MPRA Paper 23934, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 12 Jan 2010.
  59. Jean-Marie Baland & Rohini Somanathan & Zaki Wahhaj, 2014. "Group Lending and Endogenous Social Sanctions," Studies in Economics 1415, School of Economics, University of Kent.
  60. Ghosh, Suman & Van Tassel, Eric, 2013. "Funding microfinance under asymmetric information," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 8-15.
  61. Antonio Andreoni, 2013. "Microfinance," Chapters, in: Luigino Bruni & Stefano Zamagni (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Reciprocity and Social Enterprise, chapter 22, pages 227-237, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  62. Das Chaudhury, Ratul & Bhattacharya, Sukanta, 2023. "When to seek expert advice? A simple model of borrowers with limited liability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 113-120.
  63. Cameron, Alistair & Oak, Mandar & Shan, Yaping, 2021. "Peer monitoring and Islamic microfinance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 337-358.
  64. Subir Bairagi & Azzeddine Azzam, 2014. "Does the Grameen Bank exert market power over borrowers?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(12), pages 866-869, August.
  65. Daniel Clarke & Sefan Dercon, 2009. "Insurance, Credit and Safety Nets for the Poor in a World of Risk," Working Papers 81, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
  66. Giné, Xavier & Karlan, Dean S., 2014. "Group versus individual liability: Short and long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 65-83.
  67. Jeffrey Carpenter & Tyler Williams, 2010. "Moral hazard, peer monitoring, and microcredit: field experimental evidence from Paraguay," Working Papers 10-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
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