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Mission Drift in Microcredit: A Contract Theory Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Sara Biancini

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • David Ettinger

    (CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres)

  • Baptiste Venet

    (LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, DIAL - Développement, institutions et analyses de long terme, Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD))

Abstract

We analyze the relationship between Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) and external funding institutions, with the aim of contributing to the debate on "mission drift" (the tendencyfor MFIs to lend money to wealthier borrower rather than to the very poor). We suggestthat funding institutions build incentives for MFIs to choose the adequate share of poorerborrowers and to exert effort to increase the quality of the funded projects. We show thatasymmetric information on both the effort level and its cost may increase the share of richerborrowers. However the unobservability of the cost of effort has an ambiguous effect. Itpushes efficient MFIs to serve a higher share of poorer borrowers, while less efficient onesdecrease their poor outreach.

Suggested Citation

  • Sara Biancini & David Ettinger & Baptiste Venet, 2019. "Mission Drift in Microcredit: A Contract Theory Approach," Working Papers hal-02304352, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02304352
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02304352v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Microfinance; Funding Institutions; Mission Drift; Contract Theory;
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