Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents

Citations

Cited by:

1. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 2572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory," Microeconomics 0004009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
2. Christian Siemering, 2021. "The economics of dishonest insurance companies," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 46(1), pages 1-20, March.
3. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1999. "Social relations and cooperation in organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-25, January.
4. Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Willpower and Personal Rules," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 848-886, August.
   • Benabou, R. & Tirole, J., 2001. "Willpower and Personal Rules," Papers 216, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
   • Tirole, Jean & Bénabou, Roland, 2002. "Willpower and Personal Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 3143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
5. Elizabeth Brainerd & Nidhiya Menon, 2013. "Religion and Health in Early Childhood: Evidence from the Indian Subcontinent," Working Papers 65, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School.
6. Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "When is reputation bad?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 10, pages 177-205, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
   • Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2008. "When is reputation bad?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 498-526, July.
   • Jeffery Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Discussion Papers 1358, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   • Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "When is Reputation Bad," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000016, David K. Levine.
   • Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2035, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   • Levine, David & Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew, 2008. "When is Reputation Bad?," Scholarly Articles 3196337, Harvard University Department of Economics.
   • Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1962, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
7. Hall, George J. & Sargent, Thomas J., 2014. "Fiscal discriminations in three wars," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 148-166.
   • George J. Hall & Thomas J. Sargent, "undated". "Fiscal Discriminations in Three Wars," Economics Working Papers 01-03/2013, School of Business Administration, American University of Sharjah.
   • George J. Hall & Thomas J. Sargent, 2013. "Fiscal Discriminations in Three Wars," NBER Working Papers 19008, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   • George J. Hall & Thomas J. Sargent, 2013. "Fiscal Discriminations in Three Wars," Working Papers 56, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School.
8. Castro, R. & Coen-Pirani, D., 2001. "On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms," Cahiers de recherche 2001-21, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
   • CASTRO, Rui & COEN-PIRANI, Daniele, 2001. "On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms," Cahiers de recherche 2001-21, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
9. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1991. "Reputation with multiple relationships: reviving reputation models of debt," Staff Report 137, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
10. Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1999. "The Generalized War of Attrition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 175-189, March.
    • Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1996. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1142, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1999. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Game Theory and Information 9901004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," CEPR Discussion Papers 1564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," NBER Working Papers 5872, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
11. Robert Inman, 2001. "Transfers and Bailouts: Institutions for Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 141-160, June.
12. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
    • Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala & Johannes Hörner, 2008. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Working Papers hal-00489877, HAL.
    • Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Post-Print hal-00630299, HAL.
    • Johannes Horner & Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1739, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes, 2009. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," HEC Research Papers Series 921, HEC Paris.
13. Yang, Bill Z., 1996. "Learning, reputation and entry deterrence: A chain-store game with correlated entrants," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 561-573, July.
14. John Kennes & Aaron Schiff, 2003. "The Value of a Reputation System," Industrial Organization 0301011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
15. Michael Melles & Rainer Nitsche, 2016. "Multiple rounds in a chain store game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 571-579, November.
16. James E. Alt & Barry Eichengreen, 1989. "Parallel And Overlapping Games: Theory And An Application To The European Gas Trade," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 119-144, July.
17. Buckley, Peter & Kandemir, Destan & Liu, Steven Y.H. & Gençtürk, Esra F., 2024. "An internalization perspective on subsidiaries’ reputation and its impact on subsidiaries’ marketing advantage: The moderating roles of resources and autonomy," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).
18. Heski Bar-Isaac Jr. & Joyee Deb Jr., 2014. "(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 293-325, November.
19. Armando Gomes, "undated". "Going Public with Asymmetric Information, Agency Costs, and Dynamic Trading," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 04-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    • Armando Gomes, "undated". "Going Public with Asymmetric Information, Agency Costs, and Dynamic Trading," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 4-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    • Armando Gomes, "undated". "Going Public with Asymmetric Information, Agency Costs and Dynamic Trading," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 09-97, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
20. Mercier, Marion & Silve, Arthur & Tremblay-Auger, Benjamin, 2023. "Building Reputation: Proxy Wars and Transnational Identities," IZA Discussion Papers 16340, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
21. John R. Conlon, 2005. "Seemingly Unrelated Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0511004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
22. Johannes Hörner, 2002. "Reputation and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 644-663, June.
    • Johannes Hörner, "undated". "Reputation and Competition," Penn CARESS Working Papers ddea76857b552544844e6eb28, Penn Economics Department.
    • Johannes Hörner, "undated". ""Reputation and Competition''," CARESS Working Papres 99-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
23. Yang, Bill Z., 1996. "Litigation, experimentation, and reputation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 491-502, December.
24. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, 2003. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1446, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
25. Melkonian, Tigran A., 1998. "Two essays on reputation effects in economic models," ISU General Staff Papers 1998010108000012873, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.