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Social relations and cooperation in organizations

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  • Spagnolo, Giancarlo

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  • Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1999. "Social relations and cooperation in organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-25, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:38:y:1999:i:1:p:1-25
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    16. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1995. "Social Relations in the Workplace: a "Linked Games" Approach," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 76, Stockholm School of Economics.
    17. Baron, James N., 1988. "The employment relation as a social relation," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 492-525, December.
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