IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/oup/restud/v42y1975i4p623-630..html
   My bibliography  Save this item

The Optimum Quota and Retaliation

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Lockwood, Ben & Wong, Kar-yiu, 2000. "Specific and ad valorem tariffs are not equivalent in trade wars," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 183-195, October.
  2. Jones, Michael, 1995. "Bilateralism on balance," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 37-56.
  3. Antoine Bouet & David Laborde & David Martimort, 2014. "Two-Tier Asymmetric Information as a Motive for Trade, Trade Policies and Inefficient Trade Agreements," Working Papers hal-02149476, HAL.
  4. Bouet, Antoine & Laborde, David, 2008. "The potential cost of a failed Doha Round," Issue briefs 56, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  5. Ludema, Rodney D., 2001. "Optimal international trade agreements and dispute settlement procedures," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 355-376, June.
  6. Karp, Larry, 1987. "Nash Equilibrium Tariffs in a Dynamic Stochastic Game: An Application to US and EC Strategic Decisions," 1987 Occasional Paper Series No. 4 197447, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
  7. Jaime de Melo & David Tarr, 2015. "VERs under imperfect competition and foreign direct investment: A case study of the US–Japan auto VER," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Modeling Developing Countries' Policies in General Equilibrium, chapter 22, pages 461-483, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  8. Zissimos, Ben, 2009. "Optimum tariffs and retaliation: How country numbers matter," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 276-286, July.
  9. Minwook Kang, 2018. "Comparative advantage and strategic specialization," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 1-19, February.
  10. Kishore Gawande, 1997. "A Test of a Theory of Strategically Retaliatory Trade Barriers," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 425-449, October.
  11. PERJU, Genoveva Elena, 2009. "Retaliatory disagreement point with asymmetric countries. Evidence from European wine sector during enlargement," MPRA Paper 17757, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 03 Oct 2009.
  12. Chunding Li, 2017. "How Would Bilateral Trade Retaliation Affect China?," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 49(3), pages 459-479, March.
  13. Larry Karp & Sauleh Siddiqui & Jon Strand, 2016. "Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-strategic Agents: Taxes Versus Quantities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 135-158, September.
  14. Bouet, Antoine & Laborde, David, 2008. "The potential cost of a failed Doha Round:," Issue briefs 56, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  15. Cunha, Luis Campos e & Santos, Vasco, 1996. "Sleeping quotas, pre-emptive quota bidding and monopoly power," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 127-148, February.
  16. Nakanishi, Noritsugu, 1999. "Reexamination of the International Export Quota Game through the Theory of Social Situations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 132-152, April.
  17. Susanna Thede, 2005. "Determinants of Bilateral Trade Protection," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 313-328, March.
  18. Kawasaki, Ryo & Sato, Takashi & Muto, Shigeo, 2015. "Farsightedly stable tariffs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 118-124.
  19. Benjamin Liebman & Kasaundra Tomlin, 2015. "World Trade Organization sanctions, implementation, and retaliation," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 715-745, March.
  20. Rekha Misra & Sonam Choudhry, 2020. "Trade War: Likely Impact on India," Foreign Trade Review, , vol. 55(1), pages 93-118, February.
  21. Benjamin H. Liebman & Kasaundra M. Tomlin, 2008. "Safeguards and Retaliatory Threats," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(2), pages 351-376, May.
  22. Dubey, Ram Sewak & Kang, Minwook, 2020. "Industrial subsidy policy and the optimal level of specialization," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 81-88.
  23. Vanzetti, David & Kennedy, John O.S., 1989. "Optimal Retaliation in International Commodity Markets," Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 57(01-02-03), pages 1-25, December.
  24. Ryo Kawasaki & Takashi Sato & Shigeo Muto, 2012. "Farsighted Stable Sets of Tariff Games," TERG Discussion Papers 281, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
  25. Post, Gerald Vernon, 1983. "Optimal tariffs and retaliation with perfect foresight," ISU General Staff Papers 198301010800009429, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  26. Bouët, Antoine & Laborde Debucquet, David, 2017. "US trade wars with emerging countries in the 21st century: Make America and Its partners lose again," IFPRI discussion papers 1669, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  27. Susanna Thede, 2005. "Trade policy formation when geography matters for specialisation," Working Papers 200519, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
  28. kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade 0503003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  29. Antoine Bouët, 1989. "Politique tarifaire : le cœur et le nucléolus du jeu interne comme fonction de réaction du jeu externe," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(5), pages 791-816.
  30. Chao, Chi-Chur & Yu, Eden S.H. & Yu, Wusheng, 2009. "Government Budget, Public-Sector Wages, and Corporate Taxes in a Small Open Economy," Conference papers 331917, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.