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Politique tarifaire : le cœur et le nucléolus du jeu interne comme fonction de réaction du jeu externe

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  • Antoine Bouët

Abstract

[fre] Politique tarifaire : Le cœur et le nucléolus du jeu interne comme fonction de réaction du jeu externe. . Nous étudions le problème, pour un pays, de la détermination d'une politique tarifaire, lorsqu'il est composé de deux groupes de pression, dont les intérêts commerciaux sont divergents. La fonction de réaction de ce pays ne peut résulter que d'un arbitrage entre ces intérêts. Nous proposons deux solutions : dans un objectif d'efficience économique interne, le gouvernement utilise le cœur du jeu interne comme fonction de réaction du jeu externe. Le partenaire commercial, paradoxalement, gagne à ce choix. Dans un objectif de stabilité politique interne, le nucléolus du jeu interne sert de fonction de réaction au jeu externe. Le partenaire commercial y perd, pour la plupart des répartitions possibles du revenu national entre les deux groupes. Mais ce critère est susceptible d'être modifié : un groupe de pression, même subitement favorisé par son gouvernement, n'est pas certain de profiter de cette faveur. Enfin, la négociation internationale d'une réduction tarifaire devient soit impossible, soit d'une portée limitée. [eng] On tarifes : the core and nucleolus of the internal game as reaction functions of external game. . We study the problem of optimal tariff policy determination, for a country when it is composed of two groups, whose commercial interests diverge. Then, its reaction function can only result from an arbitration. We suggest two solutions. If the main concern of the home country is economic efficiency, it can be plausible that the government takes the core of the internai game as reaction function for the external game. Paradoxically, the commercial partner takes advantage of this choice. On the other hand, if the main concern is political stability, the nucleolus of the internal game is a plausible reaction function. Then the commercial partner looses with respect to the previous solution, for the largest set of internai income distributions. However, this political criterion is open to modifications and if an interest group is favoured by its government, it may loose some of its utility, relatively by to a situation of government neutrality. At last, an international negociation on tariff reduction is either impossible, or limited.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoine Bouët, 1989. "Politique tarifaire : le cœur et le nucléolus du jeu interne comme fonction de réaction du jeu externe," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(5), pages 791-816.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1989_num_40_5_409168
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1989.409168
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1989.409168
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    References listed on IDEAS

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