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Determinants of Bilateral Trade Protection

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  • Susanna Thede

Abstract

In this paper, determinants of bilateral protection levels are empirically identified when controlling for multilateral trade regulation and importing‐country‐specific factors. Strong empirical support is provided of that three bilateral factors are influencing the bilateral protection level. Specifically, a country's protection level on goods from a trade partner is positively affected by the domestic import penetration of goods produced by the trade partner, negatively influenced by the intra‐industry traded share of these imports and positively affected by the trade partner's protection level on domestic goods. Moreover, very high explanatory values are provided in the cross‐section estimations, indicating that these determinants, policy regulations and importer‐specific factors jointly explain almost all of the variation in bilateral protection levels. The results are general in the sense that estimations are performed for a large sample of bilateral trade relations including 22 trade partners that are highly differentiated in terms of country characteristics. The overall results indicate that, to the extent that policy makers can affect bilateral protection levels under multilateral trade regulation, they act on political‐economy rather than economic goals.

Suggested Citation

  • Susanna Thede, 2005. "Determinants of Bilateral Trade Protection," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 313-328, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:worlde:v:28:y:2005:i:3:p:313-328
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2005.00647.x
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