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Rent seeking and the economics of corruption

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Christopher J. Boudreaux & Boris N. Nikolaev & Randall G. Holcombe, 2018. "Corruption and destructive entrepreneurship," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 181-202, June.
  2. Rajeev K. Goel & Ummad Mazhar & James W. Saunoris, 2020. "Business operations, contestability, bureaucratic holdup, and bribe solicitations," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 1484-1510, November.
  3. Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2020. "Benefits to the majority from universal service," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(2), pages 391-408, April.
  4. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. "Where are the rent seekers?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 124-141, June.
  5. Liu, Lu & Zhao, Qiuhong & Bi, Yanlin, 2020. "Why rent-seeking behavior may exist in Chinese mining safety production inspection system and how to alleviate it: A tripartite game analysis," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
  6. Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "The social cost of contestable benefits," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-11, CIRANO.
  7. Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo.
  8. Daniel Albalate & Germà Bel & Francisco González-Gómez & Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo, 2017. "Weakening political connections by means of regulatory reform: Evidence from contracting out water services in Spain," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 211-235, October.
  9. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. "Academic exclusion: some experiences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 1-20, April.
  10. Richters, Oliver & Siemoneit, Andreas, 2017. "Fear of stagnation? A review on growth imperatives," VÖÖ Discussion Papers 6/2017, Vereinigung für Ökologische Ökonomie e.V. (VÖÖ).
  11. Thai Q. Nguyen & Giang K. Nguyen, 2020. "The impacts of civil society and inequality on the extractive capacity of authoritarian regimes: a conceptual model and the case study of Vietnam," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 489-508, December.
  12. Randall G. Holcombe, 2018. "Checks and Balances: Enforcing Constitutional Constraints," Economies, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-12, October.
  13. Nandika Sanath Kumanayake & Ajantha Sisira Kumara & Asankha Pallegedara, 2023. "The nexus between public sector corruption and private sector efficiency: Evidence from worldwide firm‐level data," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 1056-1077, May.
  14. Ciccia, Diego & Distefano, Rosaria & Reito, Francesco, 2022. "The mismatch between potential and actual shirking in a model of bureaucracy," MPRA Paper 115452, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Jean‐Claude Kouladoum, 2023. "Technology and control of corruption in Africa," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 35(6), pages 1163-1180, August.
  16. Pierre-Henri Morand & François Maréchal, 2021. "Are social and environmental clauses a tool for favoritism? Analysis of French public procurement contracts ," Post-Print hal-03418572, HAL.
  17. Zhang, Yi & Liu, Chun, 2021. "Religion and unproductive entrepreneurship: The role of risk aversion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
  18. Arteaga, Fernando & Desierto, Desiree & Koyama, Mark, 2024. "Shipwrecked by rents," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
  19. Peter K. Hazlett & Chandler S. Reilly, 2023. "Bureaucratic rent creation: the case of price discrimination in the market for postsecondary education," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 226-256, June.
  20. Sergey V. Popov, 2016. "On Basu's Proposal: Fines Affect Bribes," Economics Working Papers 16-04, Queen's Management School, Queen's University Belfast.
  21. Maréchal, François & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2022. "Are social and environmental clauses a tool for favoritism? Analysis of French public procurement contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  22. Mihály Fazekas & Johannes Wachs, 2020. "Corruption and the Network Structure of Public Contracting Markets across Government Change," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 8(2), pages 153-166.
  23. Achim Voss & Mark Schopf, 2018. "Special interest politics: Contribution schedules vs. Nash bargaining," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 256-273, July.
  24. Petr Wawrosz, 2022. "How Corruption Is and Should Be Investigated by Economic Theory," Economies, MDPI, vol. 10(12), pages 1-23, December.
  25. Alastair Langtry, 2022. "Inside the West Wing: Lobbying as a contest," Papers 2207.00800, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
  26. Victor I. Espinosa & José Antonio Peña-Ramos & Fátima Recuero-López, 2021. "The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking: Evidence from Spain’s Support Policies for Renewable Energy," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(14), pages 1-16, July.
  27. Yingying Shi, 2024. "Corruption, technical efficiency and total factor productivity growth: empirical evidence from China," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 57(6), pages 1-24, December.
  28. Hassan, M. Kabir & Karim, Md. Sydul & Kozlowski, Steven E., 2022. "Implications of public corruption for local firms: Evidence from corporate debt maturity," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
  29. Zi Wen Vivien Wong & Fanyu Chen & Thian Hee Yiew, 2021. "Effects Of Rent-Seeking On Economic Growth In Low-Income Economies," Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Bank Indonesia, vol. 24(2), pages 205-220, June.
  30. Biró, Flóra Panna & Márkus, Ádám & Erdey, László, 2016. "A kormányzás hatása a közvetlen külföldi tőkebefektetésekre Latin-Amerikában," MPRA Paper 80025, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  31. George Klay Kieh Jr., 2023. "The Peripheral State and Corruption in The Global South," Journal of Developing Societies, , vol. 39(1), pages 82-103, March.
  32. Rajeev K. Goel & Ummad Mazhar & James W. Saunoris, 2018. "Market Contestability and Bribe Solicitations: Evidence Across Stages of Firms' Operations," CESifo Working Paper Series 6981, CESifo.
  33. Alfano, Vincenzo & Capasso, Salvatore & Ercolano, Salvatore & Goel, Rajeev K., 2022. "Death takes no bribes: Impact of perceived corruption on the effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical interventions at combating COVID-19," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 301(C).
  34. Thede, Susanna & Karpaty, Patrik, 2023. "Effects of corruption on foreign direct investment: Evidence from Swedish multinational enterprises," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 348-371.
  35. Mocetti, Sauro & Orlando, Tommaso, 2019. "Corruption, workforce selection and mismatch in the public sector," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
  36. Kouramoudou Kéïta & Hannu Laurila, 2021. "Corruption and Tax Burden: What Is the Joint Effect on Total Factor Productivity?," Economies, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-16, March.
  37. Capasso, Salvatore & Santoro, Lodovico, 2018. "Active and passive corruption: Theory and evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 103-119.
  38. Gheorghița Dincă & Marius Sorin Dincă & Camelia Negri & Mihaela Bărbuță, 2021. "The Impact of Corruption and Rent-Seeking Behavior upon Economic Wealth in the European Union from a Public Choice Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(12), pages 1-23, June.
  39. Randall G. Holcombe, 2017. "Political incentives for rent creation," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 62-78, March.
  40. Patrick A. McLaughlin & Adam C. Smith & Russell S. Sobel, 2019. "Bootleggers, Baptists, and the risks of rent seeking," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 211-234, June.
  41. Hunjra, Ahmed Imran & Azam, Muhammad & Bruna, Maria Giuseppina & Bouri, Elie, 2023. "A cross-regional investigation of institutional quality and sustainable development," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
  42. Tariq Hussain & Khizra Rana, 2022. "Rent Seeking Policy, Institutions and Corruption in Specific Countries of the World," Journal of Policy Research (JPR), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 8(4), pages 283-291, December.
  43. Dennis Coates & Iuliia Naidenova & Petr Parshakov, 2019. "Determinants of governmental support of Russian companies: lessons on industrial policy, rent-seeking and corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 438-466, December.
  44. Liu, Jie & Qian, Haoqi & Zhang, Qian & Lin, Zhiyan & Siano, Pierluigi, 2023. "Corruption induced energy inefficiencies: Evidence from China's energy investment projects," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).
  45. Wang, Shuhong & Zhao, Danqing & Chen, Hanxue, 2020. "Government corruption, resource misallocation, and ecological efficiency," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
  46. Aidt, Toke S. & Hillman, Arye L. & Qijun, LIU, 2020. "Who takes bribes and how much? Evidence from the China Corruption Conviction Databank," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
  47. Khalid Sekkat, 2022. "Have you been served, your honor? Yes, thank you, your excellency: the judiciary and political corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 326-353, September.
  48. Qia, Zhang & Yanting, Jin, 2023. "Historical or contemporary causes of corruption: International evidence," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
  49. Kalyuzhnova, Yelena & Belitski, Maksim, 2019. "The impact of corruption and local content policy in on firm performance: Evidence from Kazakhstan," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 67-76.
  50. Langtry, Alastair, 2024. "Inside the West Wing: Lobbying as a contest," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
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