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Historical or contemporary causes of corruption: International evidence

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  • Qia, Zhang
  • Yanting, Jin

Abstract

This paper empirically examines the historical roots and contemporary causes of corruption. We find that: firstly, a country's history does not determine the extent of corruption; secondly, the level of economic development plays a crucial role in determining corruption and it is fundamentally important to develop the economy to combat corruption; thirdly, institutional constraints have an important impact on corruption and the combination of democratic governance, media supervision, promoting the marketization process, universal higher education. This paper provides empirical evidence for the governance of corruption in China and the fight against corruption worldwide.

Suggested Citation

  • Qia, Zhang & Yanting, Jin, 2023. "Historical or contemporary causes of corruption: International evidence," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:56:y:2023:i:c:s1544612323004166
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2023.104044
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    References listed on IDEAS

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