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Weakening political connections by means of regulatory reform: Evidence from contracting out water services in Spain

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Albalate

    (Universitat de Barcelona & GiM-IREA)

  • Germà Bel

    (Universitat de Barcelona & GiM-IREA)

  • Francisco González-Gómez

    (Universidad de Granada)

  • Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo

    (Universitat de València & INTECO Research Group)

Abstract

One area of public policy where rent-seeking and favoritism is relatively common is the contracting out of public services. Private firms can improve their chances of obtaining contracts by bribing politicians or public servants and funding political parties. In the same vein, firms can gain access to policymakers by hiring influential former politicians—a practice commonly referred to as revolving-doors. In this paper, we use information from 922 privatizations of water services in Spanish municipalities between 1984 and 2016 and multinomial logistic regression techniques to study the association between specific firms securing contracts and the political parties ruling the municipalities. We find robust statistical evidence of an association between the Popular Party (Partido Popular or PP) and the firm Aqualia, part of the large Spanish holding company Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas (FCC), which is known to have funded the Popular Party. Furthermore, former PP politicians have been appointed to top positions in the FCC Board of Directors. However, this relationship weakened after the institutional reform of 2007 on public procurement and financing of political parties, which is empirically evaluated in this paper.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Albalate & Germà Bel & Francisco González-Gómez & Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo, 2017. "Weakening political connections by means of regulatory reform: Evidence from contracting out water services in Spain," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 211-235, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:52:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11149-017-9338-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-017-9338-6
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    Cited by:

    1. Santiago Kopoboru & Gloria Cuevas-Rodríguez & Leticia Pérez-Calero, 2020. "Boards that Make a Difference in Firm’s Acquisitions: The Role of Interlocks and Former Politicians in Spain," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-19, January.
    2. Daniel Albalate & Germà Bel & Francisco González-Gómez & José C. Hernández-Gutiérrez & Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo, 2023. "Remunicipalization of Local Public Services: Policy Drivers and Changing Prices," IREA Working Papers 202319, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Dec 2023.
    3. Albalate, Daniel & Bel, Germà & González-Gómez, Francisco & Picazo-Tadeo, Andrés J., 2022. "Legislative reforms and market dynamics in the provision of urban water service by private contract operators in Spain," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    4. Daniel Albalate & Germà Bel & Francisco González-Gómez & José C. Hernández-Gutiérrez & Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo, 2024. "Changing prices after the reform of local public services: remunicipalization versus privatization," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 1-26, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rent-seeking; Political connections; Privatization; Urban water services; Spain;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities

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