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Determinants of governmental support of Russian companies: lessons on industrial policy, rent-seeking and corruption

Author

Listed:
  • Dennis Coates

    (University of Maryland Baltimore County
    National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Iuliia Naidenova

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Petr Parshakov

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

The Russian government has programs to assist Russian companies with financial and organizational support. Award of procurement contracts may also serve as assistance to companies. This paper uses data from a survey of Russian companies to draw inferences about the motivation behind the choice of recipients. Possible motivations are an intent to foster economic development, successful rent-seeking by recipients or simply corruption. The evidence is mixed. There is support for both the economic development motive and rent-seeking in the analysis of financial and organizational support. A role for corruption is most evident in the procurement contract results.

Suggested Citation

  • Dennis Coates & Iuliia Naidenova & Petr Parshakov, 2019. "Determinants of governmental support of Russian companies: lessons on industrial policy, rent-seeking and corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 438-466, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:30:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s10602-019-09289-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-019-09289-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Government support; Procurement; Industrial policy; Bribery; Public choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • L38 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Policy
    • O25 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Industrial Policy

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