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Implementation and Renegotiation
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Cited by:
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001.
"Voluntary Implementation,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1999. "Voluntary Implementation," Working Papers 1077, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007.
"Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?,"
Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 7/2006, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998.
"Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(1), pages 1-41.
- Hart, O. & Moore, J., 1989. "Default And Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model Of Debt," Working papers 520, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1997. "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 321, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1997. "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt," NBER Working Papers 5907, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1997. "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1792, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Matthew Ellman, 2006.
"Specificity Revisited: The Role of Cross-Investments,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 234-257, April.
- Matthew Ellman, 2004. "Specificity revisited: The role of cross-investments," Economics Working Papers 799, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2005.
- Matthew Ellman, 2004. "Specificity Revisited: The Role of Cross-Investments," Working Papers 150, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Guriev Sergei, 2003.
"Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-32, August.
- Sergei Guriev, 2003. "Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03595524, HAL.
- Sergei Guriev, 2003. "Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments," Post-Print hal-03595524, HAL.
- Roberto Serrano, 2009.
"On Watson's Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation,"
Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 2350-2360.
- Roberto Serrano, 2004. "On Watson's Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation," Economics Working Papers 0041, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Roberto Serrano, 2004. "On WatsonÃs Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation," Working Papers 2004-03, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Roberto Serrano, 2009. "On Watson’s Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation," Working Papers wp2009_0907, CEMFI.
- Joel Watson, 2007.
"Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 55-81, January.
- Joel Watson, 2002. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000006, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Watson, Joel, 2006. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt2m08n7cg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Watson, Joel, 2002. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt18x0r2nn, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Paul Healy, 2010.
"Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(1), pages 27-50, March.
- Paul Healy, 2005. "Equilibrium Participation in Public Goods Allocations," GSIA Working Papers 2006-E7, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011.
"Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 186-199, September.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2009. "Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003.
"Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 890-930, June.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," Penn CARESS Working Papers dfdfbbfe0a5b0e04217a58a93, Penn Economics Department.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven Matthews, 2003. "Moral hazard and capital structure dynamics," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9629, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Dewatripont, Mathias & Matthews, Steven A, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers 3487, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-006, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation - (Now published in Econometrica, 69(4) (March 2001), pp. 377-411.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 361, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Mathias Erlei & Wiebke Roß, 2013.
"Bounded Rationality as an Essential Component of the Holdup Problem,"
TUC Working Papers in Economics
0009, Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Clausthal (Department of Economics, Technical University Clausthal).
- Erlei, Mathias & Roß, Wiebke, 2015. "Bounded rationality as an essential component of the holdup problem," Beiträge zur Jahrestagung 2015 (Bayreuth) 140886, Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik.
- Massoud, Nadia & Nandy, Debarshi & Saunders, Anthony & Song, Keke, 2011. "Do hedge funds trade on private information? Evidence from syndicated lending and short-selling," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 477-499, March.
- Christoph Lülfesmann, 2021.
"Strategic Shirking in Bilateral Trade,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(4), pages 1292-1313, October.
- Christoph Luelfesmann, 2007. "Strategic Shirking in Bilateral Trade," Discussion Papers dp07-21, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
- Amoros, Pablo, 2004.
"Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 424-434, November.
- Pablo Amorós, 2003. "Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/27, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- Bhattarai, Keshab, 2015. "Constitution, Institutions and A Model for Economic Development in Nepal," MPRA Paper 93261, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Apr 2019.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999.
"Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 115-138.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1998. "Foundations of incomplete contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19354, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1846, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," NBER Working Papers 6726, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2005. "Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 223-242.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017.
"Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 153-165.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," MPRA Paper 90801, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004.
"Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In,"
Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
109, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "AGREEING NOW TO AGREE LATER: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 472, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2032, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 2004. "Agreeing now to agree later: contracts that rule out but do not rule in," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19316, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," NBER Working Papers 10397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012.
"Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
- Tercieux, Olivier & Aghion, Philippe & Fudenberg, Drew & Holden, Richard & Kunimoto, Takashi, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Scholarly Articles 11224965, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00812781, HAL.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Post-Print hal-00812781, HAL.
- Lewis A. Kornhauser & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2012.
"Contracts between Legal Persons [The Handbook of Organizational Economics],"
Introductory Chapters,,
Princeton University Press.
- Kornhauser, Lewis A. & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2010. "Contracts between Legal Persons," IZA Discussion Papers 5352, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Lewis A. Kornhauser & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2010. "Contracts between Legal Persons," NBER Working Papers 16049, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Göller, Daniel, 2015. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Holdup: When Should Messages be Sent?," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113166, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Huang, Haizhou & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2006.
"Monetary policies for developing countries: The role of institutional quality,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 239-252, September.
- Wei, Shang-Jin & Huang, Haizhou, 2005. "Monetary Policies for Developing Countries: The Role of Institutional Quality," CEPR Discussion Papers 4911, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jordi Brandts & Matthew Ellman & Gary Charness, 2016.
"Let’s Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 943-974.
- Jordi Brandts & Matthew Ellman & Gary Charness, 2016. "Let'S Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 943-974, August.
- Charness, Gary & Brandts, Jordi & Ellman, Matthew, 2012. "Let’s talk: How communication affects contract design," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt6z24s6rv, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness & Matthew Ellman, 2012. "Let's talk: How communication affects contract design," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 908.12, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness & Matthew Ellman, 2012. "Let's Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 3883, CESifo.
- Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness & Matthew Ellman, 2012. "Let's Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design," Working Papers 648, Barcelona School of Economics.
- He Huang & Minhui Hu & Robert J. Kauffman & Hongyan Xu, 2021. "The Power of Renegotiation and Monitoring in Software Outsourcing: Substitutes or Complements?," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(4), pages 1236-1261, December.
- Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2014.
"Breach remedies inducing hybrid investments,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 26-38.
- Goller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "Breach Remedies Inducing Hybrid Investments," Working Papers 72, Yale University, Department of Economics.
- Jose De Sousa & Xavier Fairise, 2013.
"On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship,"
TEPP Working Paper
2013-08, TEPP.
- José de Sousa & Xavier Fairise, 2013. "On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer–supplier relationship," Post-Print hal-04329719, HAL.
- José de Sousa & Xavier Fairise, 2013. "On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00870060, HAL.
- José de Sousa & Xavier Fairise, 2013. "On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship," Working Papers halshs-00870060, HAL.
- Hans B. Christensen & Valeri V. Nikolaev & Regina Wittenberg‐Moerman, 2016. "Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 397-435, May.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008.
"Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 268-271, December.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 6988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alexander Stremitzer, 2012.
"Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 337-359.
- Stremitzer, Alexander, 2008. "Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 242, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Alan Schwartz, 2004.
"The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.
- Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, "undated". "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2007.
"On Robust Constitution Design,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 241-279, May.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 2001. "On Robust Constitution Design," IDEI Working Papers 136, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Aug 2006.
- Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Auriol, Emmanuelle, 2002. "On Robust Constitution Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3303, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andreas Roider, 2004.
"Asset Ownership and Contractibility of Interaction,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 787-802, Winter.
- Roider, Andreas, 2002. "Asset Ownership and Contractability of Interaction," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 12/2002, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- James R. Brennan & Joel Watson, 2013.
"The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation,"
Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-20, July.
- Watson, Joel & Brennan, Jim, 2002. "The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt4242n025, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Alignement of Interests and the Governance of Joint Ventures," IDEI Working Papers 441, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Xiaokai Yang, 2000.
"Incomplete Contingent Labor Contract, Asymmetric Residual Rights and Authority, and the Theory of the Firm,"
CID Working Papers
45, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
- Xiaokai Yang, 2000. "Incomplete Contingent Labor Contract, Asymmetric Residual Rights and Authority, and the Theory of the Firm," CID Working Papers 45A, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
- Robert Evans, 2008.
"Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 459-491, May.
- Evans, R., 2006. "Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0627, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Roberts, Michael R. & Sufi, Amir, 2009. "Renegotiation of financial contracts: Evidence from private credit agreements," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 159-184, August.
- Chaserant, Camille, 2007.
"Les fondements incomplets de l’incomplétude : Une revue critique de la théorie des contrats incomplets,"
L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 83(2), pages 227-253, juin.
- Camille Chaserant, 2007. "Les fondements incomplets de l’incomplétude. Une revue critique de la théorie des contrats incomplets," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01297143, HAL.
- Camille Chaserant, 2007. "Les fondements incomplets de l’incomplétude. Une revue critique de la théorie des contrats incomplets," Post-Print halshs-01297143, HAL.
- Watson, Joel, 2006. "Contract and Mechanism Design in Settings with Multi-Period Trade," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt63s1s3j6, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Triossi, Matteo, 2005.
"Implementation with state dependent feasible sets and preferences: a renegotiation approach,"
UC3M Working papers. Economics
we057136, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Matteo Triossi & Luis Corchón, 2006. "Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 24, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Ilya Segal & Michael D.Whinston, 2012. "Property Rights [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2012.
"Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1947-1968.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008. "Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information," Discussion Papers 2008/23, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008. "Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 251, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004.
"Evidence disclosure and verifiability,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2000. "Evidence Disclosure and Verifiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt6th0060j, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2002. "Evidence Disclosure and Verfiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt19p7z2gm, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2008.
"Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead,"
Working Papers ECARES
2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2009. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/43903, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- William P. Rogerson, 1990. "Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Papers 873, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010.
"Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 258-268, April.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2008. "Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks," CEPR Discussion Papers 7056, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jean Tirole, 2009.
"Cognition and Incomplete Contracts,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 265-294, March.
- Tirole, Jean, 2008. "Cognition and Incomplete Contracts," IDEI Working Papers 453, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Buzard, Kristy & ,, 2012.
"Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
- Buzard, Kristy & Watson, Joel, 2010. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: Results on the Technology of Trade and Investment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3df3q4vg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010.
"Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," MPRA Paper 23157, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Michael R. Roberts, 2014. "The Role of Dynamic Renegotiation and Asymmetric Information in Financial Contracting," NBER Working Papers 20484, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001.
"The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory,"
Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "Repeated implementation and complexity considerations," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(4), pages 271-293, February.
- Matsui, Akihiko & Murakami, Megumi, 2022. "Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 50-65.
- Soumen Banerjee & Yi-Chun Chen & Yifei Sun, 2021. "Direct Implementation with Evidence," Papers 2105.12298, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
- Akihiko Matsui & Megumi Murakami, 2019. "A Two-Stage Model of Assignment and Market," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1112, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Tirole, Jean, 2001.
"Corporate Governance,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 1-35, January.
- Tirole, Jean, 1999. "Corporate Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2086, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tiroley, Jean, 2000. "Corporate Governance," CEI Working Paper Series 2000-1, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Thomas Ehrmann & Karl-Hans Hartwig & Torsten Marner & Hendrik Schmale, 2009. "Specific Investments and Ownership Structures in Railways – An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 12, Institute of Transport Economics, University of Muenster.
- Plambeck, Erica L. & Taylor, Terry A., 2004. "Implications of Breach Remedy and Renegotiation for Design of Supply Contracts," Research Papers 1888, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Marinov, Eduard, 2008. "Нобеловата Награда За Икономика За Икономика 2007: Теорията За Икономическите Механизми [The Nobel Price for Economics 2007: The Design of Economic Institutions]," MPRA Paper 60294, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Philippe Aghion & Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Rey, 2004.
"Transferable Control,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(1), pages 115-138, March.
- Rey, Patrick & Dewatripont, Mathias & Aghion, Philippe, 2004. "Transferable Control," Scholarly Articles 4481511, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Mathias Dewatripont, 2006. "Transferable control," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9649, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Jihong Lee, 2008.
"Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 678-694, April.
- Jihong Lee, 2007. "Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0717, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
- Andreas Roider, 2006.
"Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)Complete Contract,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(3), pages 391-411, September.
- Roider, Andreas, 2003. "Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 8/2003, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Roider, Andreas, 2004. "Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract," IZA Discussion Papers 1298, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2021. "Optimal delay in committees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 449-475.
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005.
"Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 26/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2008.
"Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism Design,"
Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers
275717, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Zvika Neeman & Gregory Pavlov, 2010. "Renegotiation-proof Mechanism Design," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20101, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2009. "Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism Design," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275726, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Papoutsi, Melina, 2021. "Lending relationships in loan renegotiation: evidence from corporate loans," Working Paper Series 2553, European Central Bank.
- Maskin, Eric, 2002.
"On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 725-733, May.
- Eric Maskin, 2001. "On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," Economics Working Papers 0008, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2009.
"Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 307-330, May.
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