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Market discipline of bank risk: theory and evidence

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Molyneux, Philip & Upreti, Vineet & Zhou, Tim, 2023. "Depositor market discipline: New evidence from selling failed banks," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
  2. Elijah Brewer III & Thomas H. Mondschean & Philip Strahan, 1996. "The Role of Monitoring in Reducing the Moral Hazard Problem Associated with Government Guarantees: Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-15, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  3. Clemens Kool, 2006. "Financial Stability in European Banking: The Role of Common Factors," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 525-540, December.
  4. Thomas L. Hogan & William J. Luther, 2016. "The Implicit Costs of Government Deposit Insurance," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Summer 20), pages 1-13.
  5. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1992. "Forbearance, subordinated debt, and the cost of capital for insured depository institutions," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 28(Q III), pages 16-26.
  6. Mark Flannery, 2001. "The Faces of “Market Discipline”," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 20(2), pages 107-119, October.
  7. anonymous, 1999. "Using subordinated debt as an instrument of market discipline," Staff Studies 172, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  8. Ionica Munteanu (Costache), 2013. "Optimizing Bank Liquidity In Central And Eastern Europe," Review of Economic and Business Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, issue 11, pages 83-90, June.
  9. Kaen, Fred R. & Michalsen, Dag, 1997. "The effects of the Norwegian banking crisis on Norwegian equities," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 83-111, June.
  10. Larry D. Wall, 1997. "Taking note of the deposit insurance fund: a plan for the FDIC to issue capital notes," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 82(Q 1), pages 14-30.
  11. Mireille Jaeger, 1996. "Les effets de la réglementation sur la valorisation des banques et leur incitation à la prise de risque," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 11(4), pages 37-82.
  12. Reza Vaez-Zadeh & Danyang Xie & Edda Zoli, 2002. "MODIS: A Market-Oriented Deposit Insurance Scheme," Finance 0212001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Martin Eling, 2012. "What Do We Know About Market Discipline in Insurance?," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 15(2), pages 185-223, September.
  14. Lang, William W. & Robertson, Douglas D., 2002. "Analysis of proposals for a minimum subordinated debt requirement1," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 115-136.
  15. Robert R. Bliss, 2001. "Market discipline and subordinated debt: a review of some salient issues," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 25(Q I), pages 24-45.
  16. Robert R. Bliss & Mark J. Flannery, 2000. "Market discipline in the governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: monitoring vs. influencing," Working Paper Series WP-00-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  17. Rosalind L. Bennett & Mark D. Vaughan & Timothy J. Yeager, 2005. "Should the FDIC worry about the FHLB? The impact of Federal Home Loan Bank advances on the Bank Insurance Fund," Working Paper 05-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  18. María Soledad Martínez & Sergio Schmukler, 1999. "Do Depositors Punish Banks For "Bad" Behavior?: Examining Market Discipline In Argentina, Chile, And Mexico," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 48, Central Bank of Chile.
  19. Jezabel Couppey, 2000. "Vers un nouveau schéma de réglementation prudentielle : une contribution au débat," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 56(1), pages 37-56.
  20. Philip Molyneux & Vineet Upreti & Tim Zhou, 2022. "Depositor Market Discipline: New Evidence from Selling Failed Banks," Working Papers 2022-03, Swansea University, School of Management.
  21. Stojanovic, Dusan & Vaughan, Mark D. & Yeager, Timothy J., 2008. "Do Federal Home Loan Bank membership and advances increase bank risk-taking?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 680-698, May.
  22. Lisa Barrow & Cecilia Elena Rouse, 2000. "Using market valuation to assess the importance and efficiency of public school spending," Working Paper Series WP-00-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  23. John S. Jordan, 1997. "Insiders' assessments of the stock market's pricing of New England banks," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Jul, pages 3-16.
  24. Sangkyun Park, 1994. "Explanations for the increased riskiness of banks in the 1980s," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 3-24.
  25. Marc D. Morris & John R. Walter, 1998. "Large negotiable certificates of deposit," Monograph, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, number 1998lnco.
  26. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2000. "Subordinated debt and bank capital reform," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2000-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  27. Robert R. Bliss & Mark J. Flannery, 2001. "Market Discipline in the Governance of US Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring versus Influencing," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 107-146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  28. Bremer, Marc & Pettway, Richard H., 2002. "Information and the market's perceptions of Japanese bank risk: Regulation, environment, and disclosure," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 119-139, April.
  29. Park, Sangkyun & Peristiani, Stavros, 2007. "Are bank shareholders enemies of regulators or a potential source of market discipline?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(8), pages 2493-2515, August.
  30. Elfers, Ferdinand & Koenraadt, Jeroen, 2022. "What you don’t know won’t hurt you: Market monitoring and bank supervisors’ preference for private information," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
  31. Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad & Schmukler, Sergio L., 1999. "Do depositors punish banks for"bad"behavior? : market discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2058, The World Bank.
  32. Godspower-Akpomiemie, Euphemia & Ojah, Kalu, 2021. "Market discipline, regulation and banking effectiveness: Do measures matter?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
  33. Lown, Cara & Peristiani, Stavros, 1996. "The behavior of consumer loan rates during the 1990 credit slowdown," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(10), pages 1673-1694, December.
  34. David VanHoose, 2007. "Market Discipline and Supervisory Discretion in Banking: Reinforcing or Conflicting Pillars of Basel II?," NFI Working Papers 2007-WP-06, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
  35. Warren P. Hogan & Ian G. Sharpe, 1997. "Prudential Regulation of the Financial System: A Functional Approach," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 4(1), pages 15-28.
  36. Hendrickson, Jill M., 2000. "The impact of bank failures on local bank pricing decisions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 401-416.
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