IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jbfina/v32y2008i5p680-698.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Do Federal Home Loan Bank membership and advances increase bank risk-taking?

Author

Listed:
  • Stojanovic, Dusan
  • Vaughan, Mark D.
  • Yeager, Timothy J.

Abstract

Since the early 1990s, commercial banks have turned to Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) advances to plug the gap between loan and deposit growth. Is this trend worrisome? On the one hand, advances implicitly encourage risk by insulating borrowers from market discipline. On the other, advances give borrowers greater flexibility to managing interest rate and liquidity risk. And access to FHLBank funding encourages members to reshape their balance sheets in ways that could lower credit risk. Using quarterly financial and supervisory data for banks from 1992 to 2005, we assess the effect of FHLBank membership and advances on risk. The evidence suggests liquidity and leverage risks rose modestly, but interest-rate risk declined somewhat. Credit risk and overall failure risk were largely unaffected. Although the evidence suggest FHLBank membership and advances have had, at best, only a modest impact on bank risk, we caution that our sample period constitutes one observation and that moral hazard could be pronounced if leverage ratios revert to historical norms.

Suggested Citation

  • Stojanovic, Dusan & Vaughan, Mark D. & Yeager, Timothy J., 2008. "Do Federal Home Loan Bank membership and advances increase bank risk-taking?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 680-698, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:32:y:2008:i:5:p:680-698
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378-4266(07)00213-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Donald Morgan & Kevin Stiroh, 2001. "Market Discipline of Banks: The Asset Test," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 20(2), pages 195-208, October.
    2. Flannery, Mark J & Sorescu, Sorin M, 1996. "Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983-1991," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1347-1377, September.
    3. Thakor, Anjan V., 1982. "Toward a theory of bank loan commitments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 55-83, March.
    4. Darrell Duffie & Robert Jarrow & Amiyatosh Purnanandam & Wei Yang, 2008. "Market Pricing of Deposit Insurance," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Financial Derivatives Pricing Selected Works of Robert Jarrow, chapter 22, pages 551-577, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, 2004. "Regulating housing GSEs: thoughts on institutional structure and authorities," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 89(Q 2), pages 87-102.
    6. Rosalind L. Bennett & Mark D. Vaughan & Timothy J. Yeager, 2005. "Should the FDIC worry about the FHLB? The impact of Federal Home Loan Bank advances on the Bank Insurance Fund," Working Paper 05-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    7. W. Scott Frame, 2003. "Federal Home Loan Bank mortgage purchases: Implications for mortgage markets," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 88(Q3), pages 17-31.
    8. DeYoung, Robert, et al, 2001. "The Information Content of Bank Exam Ratings and Subordinated Debt Prices," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(4), pages 900-925, November.
    9. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
    10. R. Alton Gilbert, 1994. "Federal Reserve lending to banks that failed: implications for the Bank Insurance Fund," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 3-18.
    11. Gilbert, R. Alton, 1995. "Determinants of Federal Reserve lending to failed banks," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 397-408, December.
    12. William Poole, 2003. "Housing in the macroeconomy," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 85(May), pages 1-8.
    13. Ron J. Feldman & Jason Schmidt, 2000. "Financial modernization, the FHLB and agricultural banks," Fedgazette, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 12(Oct), pages 16-17.
    14. Deirdre N. McCloskey & Stephen T. Ziliak, 1996. "The Standard Error of Regressions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 97-114, March.
    15. Wayne Passmore, 2003. "The GSE implicit subsidy and value of government ambiguity," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2003-64, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    16. Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
    17. Wheelock, David C & Kumbhakar, Subal C, 1995. "Which Banks Choose Deposit Insurance? Evidence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Insurance System," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(1), pages 186-201, February.
    18. Rebel Cole & Jeffery Gunther, 1998. "Predicting Bank Failures: A Comparison of On- and Off-Site Monitoring Systems," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 13(2), pages 103-117, April.
    19. Rebel A. Cole & Jeffery W. Gunther, 1995. "FIMS: a new monitoring system for banking institutions," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Jan, pages 1-15.
    20. Billett, Matthew T. & Garfinkel, Jon A. & O'Neal, Edward S., 1998. "The cost of market versus regulatory discipline in banking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 333-358, June.
    21. Beverly Hirtle & Jose A. Lopez, 1999. "Supervisory information and the frequency of bank examinations," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 5(Apr), pages 1-20.
    22. Gregory E. Sierra & Timothy J. Yeager, 2004. "What does the Federal Reserve's economic value model tell us about interest rate risk at U.S. community banks?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 86(Nov), pages 45-60.
    23. James A. Embersit & James V. Houpt, 1991. "A method for evaluating interest rate risk in U.S. commercial banks," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Aug, pages 625-637.
    24. Grossman, Richard S, 1992. "Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Moral Hazard in the Thrift Industry: Evidence from the 1930's," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 800-821, September.
    25. James V. Houpt & David M. Wright, 1996. "An analysis of commercial bank exposure to interest rate risk," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), vol. 82(Feb), pages 115-128, February.
    26. Robert N. Collender & Julie A. Frizell, 2002. "Small Commercial Banks and the Federal Home Loan Bank System," International Regional Science Review, , vol. 25(3), pages 279-303, July.
    27. Michael Falkenheim & George Pennacchi, 2003. "The Cost of Deposit Insurance for Privately Held Banks: A Market Comparable Approach," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 24(2), pages 121-148, October.
    28. Ben Craig & James Thomson, 2003. "Federal Home Loan Bank Lending to Community Banks: Are Targeted Subsidies Desirable?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 23(1), pages 5-28, February.
    29. R. Alton Gilbert, 1990. "Market discipline of bank risk: theory and evidence," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 3-18.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. W. Scott Frame & Diana Hancock & Wayne Passmore, 2012. "Federal Home Loan Bank Advances and Commercial Bank Portfolio Composition," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(4), pages 661-684, June.
    2. Adam Ashcraft & Morten L. Bech & W. Scott Frame, 2010. "The Federal Home Loan Bank System: The Lender of Next-to-Last Resort?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(4), pages 551-583, June.
    3. Scott Deacle & Elyas Elyasiani, 2016. "Cost of debt and federal home loan bank funding at U.S. bank and thrift holding companies," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(50), pages 4878-4893, October.
    4. Massimiliano Affinito, 2013. "Central bank refinancing, interbank markets, and the hypothesis of liquidity hoarding: evidence from a euro-area banking system," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 928, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    5. Travis Davidson & W. Simpson, 2016. "Federal Home Loan Bank advances and bank risk," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 40(1), pages 137-156, January.
    6. Papanikolaou, Nikolaos I., 2018. "To be bailed out or to be left to fail? A dynamic competing risks hazard analysis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 61-85.
    7. James Cash Acrey & Wayne Y. Lee & Timothy J. Yeager, 2019. "Can Federal Home Loan Banks effectively self-regulate lending to influential banks?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 20(2), pages 197-210, June.
    8. Guo, Lin & Prezas, Alexandros P., 2019. "Market monitoring and influence: evidence from deposit pricing and liability composition from 1986 to 2013," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 146-166.
    9. Toni Ahnert & Kartik Anand & Prasanna Gai & James Chapman & Philip StrahanEditor, 2019. "Asset Encumbrance, Bank Funding, and Fragility," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(6), pages 2422-2455.
    10. Ding, Cherng G. & Wu, Chiu-Hui & Chang, Pao-Long, 2013. "The influence of government intervention on the trajectory of bank performance during the global financial crisis: A comparative study among Asian economies," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 556-564.
    11. Atanasov, Vladimir & Merrick, John, 2011. "Financial asset demand is elastic: Evidence from new issues of Federal Home Loan Bank debt," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 3225-3239.
    12. Theoharry Grammatikos & Nikolaos I. Papanikolaou, 2021. "Applying Benford’s Law to Detect Accounting Data Manipulation in the Banking Industry," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 59(1), pages 115-142, April.
    13. Angelos Kanas & Panagiotis D. Zervopoulos, 2022. "Federal home loan bank advances and systemic risk," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 59(4), pages 1525-1557, November.
    14. Celia Álvarez‐Botas & Víctor M. González, 2021. "Institutions, banking structure and the cost of debt: new international evidence," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(1), pages 265-303, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rosalind L. Bennett & Mark D. Vaughan & Timothy J. Yeager, 2005. "Should the FDIC worry about the FHLB? The impact of Federal Home Loan Bank advances on the Bank Insurance Fund," Working Paper 05-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    2. Thomas B. King & Daniel A. Nuxoll & Timothy J. Yeager, 2006. "Are the causes of bank distress changing? can researchers keep up?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 88(Jan), pages 57-80.
    3. R. Alton Gilbert & Andrew P. Meyer & Mark D. Vaughan, 2006. "Can feedback from the jumbo CD market improve bank surveillance?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 92(Spr), pages 135-175.
    4. Jones, Jeffrey S. & Lee, Wayne Y. & Yeager, Timothy J., 2013. "Valuation and systemic risk consequences of bank opacity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 693-706.
    5. Klaus Schaeck & Martin Cihak & Andrea Maechler & Stephanie Stolz, 2011. "Who Disciplines Bank Managers?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 197-243.
    6. Craig, Ben R. & Dinger, Valeriya, 2013. "Deposit market competition, wholesale funding, and bank risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 3605-3622.
    7. Daniel M. Covitz & Diana Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, 2004. "A reconsideration of the risk sensitivity of U.S. banking organization subordinated debt spreads: a sample selection approach," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sep, pages 73-92.
    8. John Krainer & Jose A. Lopez, 2003. "How might financial market information be used for supervisory purposes?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 29-45.
    9. Randall Kroszner, 2016. "A Review of Bank Funding Cost Differentials," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 151-174, June.
    10. David VanHoose, 2007. "Market Discipline and Supervisory Discretion in Banking: Reinforcing or Conflicting Pillars of Basel II?," NFI Working Papers 2007-WP-06, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    11. John Krainer & Jose A. Lopez, 2008. "Using Securities Market Information for Bank Supervisory Monitoring," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(1), pages 125-164, March.
    12. Spiegel, Mark M. & Yamori, Nobuyoshi, 2007. "Market price accounting and depositor discipline: The case of Japanese regional banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 769-786, March.
    13. anonymous, 1999. "Using subordinated debt as an instrument of market discipline," Staff Studies 172, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    14. Allen N. Berger & Martien Lamers & Raluca A. Roman & Koen Schoors, 2023. "Supply and Demand Effects of Bank Bailouts: Depositors Need Not Apply and Need Not Run," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(6), pages 1397-1442, September.
    15. Hett, Florian & Schmidt, Alexander, 2017. "Bank rescues and bailout expectations: The erosion of market discipline during the financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(3), pages 635-651.
    16. Pennacchi, George G., 2005. "Risk-based capital standards, deposit insurance, and procyclicality," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 432-465, October.
    17. Heller, Yuval & Peleg Lazar, Sharon & Raviv, Alon, 2022. "Banks’ risk taking and creditors’ bargaining power," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    18. Adam B. Ashcraft & Hoyt Bleakley, 2006. "On the market discipline of informationally opaque firms: evidence from bank borrowers in the federal funds market," Staff Reports 257, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    19. Landskroner, Yoram & Paroush, Jacob, 2008. "Bank management and market discipline," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 60(5), pages 395-414.
    20. Martin Eling, 2012. "What Do We Know About Market Discipline in Insurance?," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 15(2), pages 185-223, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:32:y:2008:i:5:p:680-698. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.