Vers un nouveau schéma de réglementation prudentielle : une contribution au débat
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DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2000.3812
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2000.3812
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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