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Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Yoichi Kasajima, 2013. "Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 203-215, June.
  2. Aziz, Haris & Brandl, Florian, 2022. "The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 168-187.
  3. Daniel Kornbluth & Alexey Kushnir, 2024. "Undergraduate Course Allocation through Competitive Markets," Papers 2412.05691, arXiv.org.
  4. Balbuzanov, Ivan, 2020. "Short trading cycles: Paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 78-87.
  5. Balbuzanov, Ivan, 2022. "Constrained random matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
  6. Haris Aziz & Florian Brandl, 2020. "The Vigilant Eating Rule: A General Approach for Probabilistic Economic Design with Constraints," Papers 2008.08991, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
  7. Onur Kesten & Morimitsu Kurino & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2017. "Efficient lottery design," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 31-57, January.
  8. Hashimoto, Tadashi, 2018. "The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 708-733.
  9. Carroll, Gabriel, 2014. "A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 163-177.
  10. Ortega, Josué, 2020. "Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 15-24.
  11. Can Zhang & Atalay Atasu & Turgay Ayer & L. Beril Toktay, 2020. "Truthful Mechanisms for Medical Surplus Product Allocation," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 22(4), pages 735-753, July.
  12. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 14-25.
  13. Diebold, Franz & Bichler, Martin, 2017. "Matching with indifferences: A comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 260(1), pages 268-282.
  14. Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu & Ünver, M. Utku, 2017. "On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 56-62.
  15. Eun Jeong Heo & Vikram Manjunath, 2017. "Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 5-30, January.
  16. Nguyen, Thành & Peivandi, Ahmad & Vohra, Rakesh, 2016. "Assignment problems with complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 209-241.
  17. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2014. "Assigning agents to a line," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 539-553.
  18. Jörgen Kratz, 2017. "Overlapping multiple object assignments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(3), pages 723-753, March.
  19. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2018. "The object allocation problem with random priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 71-89.
  20. Eric Budish & Judd B. Kessler, 2022. "Can Market Participants Report Their Preferences Accurately (Enough)?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1107-1130, February.
  21. Kojima, Fuhito & Manea, Mihai, 2010. "Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 106-123, January.
  22. Priyanka Shende, 2020. "Constrained Serial Rule on the Full Preference Domain," Papers 2011.01178, arXiv.org.
  23. Thanh Nguyen & Ahmad Peivandi & Rakesh Vohra, 2014. "One-Sided Matching with Limited Complementarities," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-030, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  24. Han, Xiang, 2024. "A theory of fair random allocation under priorities," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(3), July.
  25. Chang, Hee-In & Chun, Youngsub, 2017. "Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 80-92.
  26. Heo, Eun Jeong, 2014. "Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: A generalization of the serial rule and its characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 40-47.
  27. Wonki Jo Cho, 2018. "Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 137-162, June.
  28. Aperjis, Christina & Kotowski, Maciej & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2019. "Efficient Division When Preferences are Private: Using the Expected Externality Mechanism," Working Paper Series rwp19-014, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  29. Yasushi Kawase & Hanna Sumita & Yu Yokoi, 2022. "Random Assignment of Indivisible Goods under Constraints," Papers 2208.07666, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
  30. Haris Aziz & Yoichi Kasajima, 2017. "Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 255-275, August.
  31. Marek Bojko, 2020. "The Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms with Minimum Quotas," Papers 2012.11028, arXiv.org.
  32. Andrew McLennan & Shino Takayama & Yuki Tamura, 2024. "An Efficient, Computationally Tractable School Choice Mechanism," Discussion Papers Series 668, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
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