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Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences

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  • Yoichi Kasajima

Abstract

We consider the problem of assigning indivisible goods among a group of agents with lotteries when the preference profile is single-peaked. Unfortunately, even on this restricted domain of preferences, equal treatment of equals, stochastic dominance efficiency, and stochastic dominance strategy-proofness are incompatible. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Yoichi Kasajima, 2013. "Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 203-215, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:41:y:2013:i:1:p:203-215
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0674-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(3), pages 249-268, October.
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    9. Hervé Moulin & Anna Bogomolnaia, 2002. "A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(3), pages 623-636.
    10. Kojima, Fuhito & Manea, Mihai, 2010. "Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 106-123, January.
    11. Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima, 2010. "Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1625-1672, September.
    12. Kentaro Hatsumi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2009. "Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 423-447, September.
    13. Kentaro Hatsumi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2007. "Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies of Homogeneous Indivisible Goods," ISER Discussion Paper 0686, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Feb 2009.
    14. Katta, Akshay-Kumar & Sethuraman, Jay, 2006. "A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 231-250, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ehlers, Lars, 2018. "Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 393-407.
    2. Liu, Peng, 2020. "Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 565-584.
    3. Liu, Peng & Zeng, Huaxia, 2019. "Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 176-194.
    4. Bhardwaj, Bhavook & Kumar, Rajnish & Ortega, Josué, 2020. "Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    5. Aziz, Haris & Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2017. "Computational aspects of assigning agents to a line," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 93-99.
    6. William Thomson, 2018. "On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(1), pages 67-99, June.
    7. Youngsub Chun & Kiyong Yun, 2020. "Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 667-687, April.
    8. Hikaru Kondo, 2019. "Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 23(3), pages 113-126, December.
    9. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2014. "Assigning agents to a line," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 539-553.
    10. Alva, Samson & Manjunath, Vikram, 2020. "The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 15-29.
    11. Chang, Hee-In & Chun, Youngsub, 2017. "Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 80-92.
    12. Wonki Jo Cho, 2018. "Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 137-162, June.
    13. Haris Aziz & Yoichi Kasajima, 2017. "Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 255-275, August.
    14. Chatterji, Shurojit & Liu, Peng, 2020. "Random assignments of bundles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 15-30.

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