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Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: A generalization of the serial rule and its characterization

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  • Heo, Eun Jeong

Abstract

We study a probabilistic assignment problem when agents have multi-unit demands for objects. We first introduce two fairness requirements to accommodate different demands across agents. We show that each of these requirements is incompatible with stochastic dominance efficiency (henceforth, we use the prefix “sd” for stochastic dominance) and weak sd-strategy-proofness, unless all agents have unitary demands. We next introduce a new incentive requirement which we call limited invariance. We explore implications of these requirements in combination of consistency or converse consistency.

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  • Heo, Eun Jeong, 2014. "Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: A generalization of the serial rule and its characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 40-47.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:54:y:2014:i:c:p:40-47
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.08.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Han, Xiang, 2016. "On the consistency of random serial dictatorship," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 168-171.
    2. Balbuzanov, Ivan, 2022. "Constrained random matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    3. Ortega, Josué, 2020. "Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 15-24.
    4. Youngsub Chun & Kiyong Yun, 2020. "Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 667-687, April.
    5. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 14-25.
    6. Eun Jeong Heo & Vikram Manjunath, 2017. "Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 5-30, January.
    7. Ping Zhan, 2023. "A Simple Characterization of Assignment Mechanisms on Set Constraints," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 1-15, June.
    8. Y. Charles Li & Hong Yang, 2016. "A mathematical model of demand-supply dynamics with collectability and saturation factors," Papers 1606.06720, arXiv.org.
    9. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2018. "The object allocation problem with random priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 71-89.
    10. Heo, Eun Jeong & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2015. "A characterization of the extended serial correspondence," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 102-110.
    11. Yoshio Sano & Ping Zhan, 2021. "Extended Random Assignment Mechanisms on a Family of Good Sets," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 1-30, December.
    12. Han, Xiang, 2024. "A theory of fair random allocation under priorities," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(3), July.
    13. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, 2023. "Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(3), pages 465-484, October.
    14. Shende, Priyanka & Purohit, Manish, 2023. "Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    15. Haris Aziz & Yoichi Kasajima, 2017. "Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 255-275, August.
    16. Basteck, Christian, 2018. "Fair solutions to the random assignment problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 163-172.

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