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The holdout problem, urban sprawl, and eminent domain

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Thomas Miceli, 2011. "Free riders, holdouts, and public use: a tale of two externalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 105-117, July.
  2. Sean M. Collins & R. Mark Isaac, 2012. "Holdout: Existence, Information, and Contingent Contracting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(4), pages 793-814.
  3. Kurtis Swope & Ryan Wielgus & Pamela Schmitt & John Cadigan, 2011. "Contracts, Behavior, and the Land-assembly Problem: An Experimental Study," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments on Energy, the Environment, and Sustainability, pages 151-180, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
  4. Cadigan, John & Schmitt, Pamela & Shupp, Robert & Swope, Kurtis, 2011. "The holdout problem and urban sprawl: Experimental evidence," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 72-81, January.
  5. McFarlane, Nick & Hurley, Joe & Sun, Qian (Chayn), 2023. "Private-led land assembly and urban consolidation: The relative influence of regulatory zoning mechanisms," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
  6. Lönnroth, Tea & Krigsholm, Pauliina & Falkenbach, Heidi & Oikarinen, Elias, 2024. "Advancing understanding of the linkages between local land policy interventions and the responsiveness of housing supply: Intervention mechanisms in the Finnish context," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
  7. Grossman, Zachary & Pincus, Jonathan & Shapiro, Perry & Yengin, Duygu, 2019. "Second-best mechanisms for land assembly and hold-out problems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 1-16.
  8. Isaac, R. Mark & Kitchens, Carl & Portillo, Javier E., 2016. "Can buyer “mobility” reduce aggregation failures in land-assembly?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 16-30.
  9. John Cadigan & Pamela Schmitt & Robert Shupp & Kurtis Swope, 2009. "An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 76(2), pages 444-457, October.
  10. Winn, Abel M. & McCarter, Matthew W., 2018. "Who's holding out? An experimental study of the benefits and burdens of eminent domain," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 176-185.
  11. Paul F. Byrne, 2017. "Have Post-Kelo Restrictions on Eminent Domain Influenced State Economic Development?," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 31(1), pages 81-91, February.
  12. Usha Sridhar & Sridhar Mandyam, 2013. "A Group Utility Maximizer Mechanism for Land Assembly," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 466-488, October.
  13. Zhongyu He & Yasushi Asami, 2014. "How Do Landowners Price their Lands during Land Expropriation and the Motives Behind It: An Explanation from a WTA/WTP Experiment in Central Beijing," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 51(2), pages 412-427, February.
  14. Valtonen, Eero & Falkenbach, Heidi & Viitanen, Kauko, 2018. "Securing public objectives in large-scale urban development: Comparison of public and private land development," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 481-492.
  15. Uyanik, Metin & Yengin, Duygu, 2023. "Expropriation power in private dealings: Quota rule in collective sales," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 548-580.
  16. Monique DANTAS & Frédéric GASCHET & Guillaume POUYANNE, 2010. "Regulatory zoning and coastal housing prices: a bayesian hedonic approach (In French)," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2010-12, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
  17. Kaur Karamjit, 2017. "On the Rationale of Coercive Land Acquisitions," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 1-16, August.
  18. Jenny Schuetz, 2020. "Teardowns, popups, and renovations: How does housing supply change?," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 459-480, June.
  19. Swope, Kurtis J. & Cadigan, John & Schmitt, Pamela, 2014. "That's my final offer! Bargaining behavior with costly delay and credible commitment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 44-53.
  20. Yamasaki, Junichi & Nakajima, Kentaro & Teshima, Kensuke, 2021. "From Samurai to Skyscrapers: How Historical Lot Fragmentation Shapes Tokyo," TDB-CAREE Discussion Paper Series E-2020-02, Teikoku Databank Center for Advanced Empirical Research on Enterprise and Economy, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  21. Turnbull Geoffrey & Salvino Robert & Tasto Michael, 2018. "Using Eminent Domain for Economic Development: Does it Increase Private Sector Employment?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(3), pages 1-24, November.
  22. Korthals Altes, Willem K., 2019. "Planning initiative: Promoting development by the use of options in Amsterdam," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 13-21.
  23. Kitchens, Carl & Roomets, Alex, 2015. "Dealing with eminent domain," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 22-31.
  24. Zakharenko, Roman, 2021. "Optimal compulsion for private assembly of property," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
  25. Portillo, Javier E., 2019. "Land-assembly and externalities: How do positive post-development externalities affect land aggregation outcomes?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 104-124.
  26. In Park, 2013. "Modeling the externalities and redevelopment of a run-down area," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 51(3), pages 893-915, December.
  27. Dick M. Carpenter II & John K. Ross, 2010. "Do Restrictions on Eminent Domain Harm Economic Development?," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 24(4), pages 337-351, November.
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