IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/anresc/v51y2013i3p893-915.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Modeling the externalities and redevelopment of a run-down area

Author

Listed:
  • In Park

Abstract

This paper models the redevelopment of a run-down area in terms of the externalities from abandonment to apply to the slow response time of the local government and private firms to redevelop such areas. The conversion of abandoned properties for new uses creates two types of positive externalities, real externalities and pecuniary externalities. The first refers to a productivity gain for all firms due to the elimination of negative nuisance of abandonment, while the latter refers to an output price decrease due to the increased production as a result of the conversion. In the case of private development, these externalities are not fully considered by private firms, leading to delayed conversions. The redevelopment process may also be delayed by the fragmented ownership of properties. This paper shows that conversion occurs earlier in the case of single ownership than for fragmented ownership, if the real externality is dominant to the pecuniary externality. In the case of local optimum, the local government considers both types of externalities but only maximizes the value of the properties within the community. The local government fails to take into account the effect on society as a whole, leading to delayed redevelopment. These results suggest the need for interventions of the central government for managing abandoned properties at the early stage of abandonment. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Suggested Citation

  • In Park, 2013. "Modeling the externalities and redevelopment of a run-down area," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 51(3), pages 893-915, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:anresc:v:51:y:2013:i:3:p:893-915
    DOI: 10.1007/s00168-013-0566-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00168-013-0566-0
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00168-013-0566-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Strange William C., 1995. "Information, Holdouts, and Land Assembly," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 317-332, November.
    2. Richard Arnott & Russell Davidson & David Pines, 1983. "Housing Quality, Maintenance and Rehabilitation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(3), pages 467-494.
    3. Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, 1994. "Investment under Uncertainty," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 5474.
    4. de Leeuw, Frank, 1971. "The Demand for Housing: A Review of Cross-Section Evidence," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 53(1), pages 1-10, February.
    5. Menezes, Flavio & Pitchford, Rohan, 2004. "The land assembly problem revisited," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 155-162, March.
    6. Miceli, Thomas J. & Sirmans, C.F., 2007. "The holdout problem, urban sprawl, and eminent domain," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3-4), pages 309-319, November.
    7. Eckart, Wolfgang, 1985. "On the land assembly problem," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 364-378, November.
    8. Tibor Scitovsky, 1954. "Two Concepts of External Economies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 143-143.
    9. Sonstelie, Jon C. & Portney, Paul R., 1978. "Profit maximizing communities and the theory of local public expenditure," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 263-277, April.
    10. Brueckner, Jan K., 1981. "A dynamic model of housing production," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 1-14, July.
    11. Brueckner, Jan K., 1983. "Property value maximization and public sector efficiency," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-15, July.
    12. Wooders, Myrna, 1978. "Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 328-348, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bo-sin Tang & Kwan To Wong, 2020. "Assessing externality: Successive event studies on market impacts of new housing development on an old residential neighbourhood," Environment and Planning B, , vol. 47(1), pages 156-173, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kurtis Swope & Ryan Wielgus & Pamela Schmitt & John Cadigan, 2011. "Contracts, Behavior, and the Land-assembly Problem: An Experimental Study," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments on Energy, the Environment, and Sustainability, pages 151-180, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    2. Cadigan, John & Schmitt, Pamela & Shupp, Robert & Swope, Kurtis, 2011. "The holdout problem and urban sprawl: Experimental evidence," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 72-81, January.
    3. Winn, Abel M. & McCarter, Matthew W., 2018. "Who's holding out? An experimental study of the benefits and burdens of eminent domain," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 176-185.
    4. John Cadigan & Pamela Schmitt & Robert Shupp & Kurtis Swope, 2009. "An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 76(2), pages 444-457, October.
    5. Jana, Arnab & Basu, Rounaq & Mukherjee, Conan, 2020. "A game theoretic approach to optimize multi-stakeholder utilities for land acquisition negotiations with informality," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    6. Sean M. Collins & R. Mark Isaac, 2012. "Holdout: Existence, Information, and Contingent Contracting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(4), pages 793-814.
    7. Zhao, Weihua, 2022. "The long-run effects of minimum lot size zoning on housing redevelopment," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    8. John McDonald, 2008. "Maximization of nonresidential property tax revenue by a local government," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(12), pages 925-928.
    9. Lindenthal, Thies & Eichholtz, Piet & Geltner, David, 2017. "Land assembly in Amsterdam, 1832–2015," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 57-67.
    10. Isaac, R. Mark & Kitchens, Carl & Portillo, Javier E., 2016. "Can buyer “mobility” reduce aggregation failures in land-assembly?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 16-30.
    11. Duranton, Gilles & Puga, Diego, 2015. "Urban Land Use," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 467-560, Elsevier.
    12. Paul F. Byrne, 2017. "Have Post-Kelo Restrictions on Eminent Domain Influenced State Economic Development?," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 31(1), pages 81-91, February.
    13. Portillo, Javier E., 2019. "Land-assembly and externalities: How do positive post-development externalities affect land aggregation outcomes?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 104-124.
    14. Zhongyu He & Yasushi Asami, 2014. "How Do Landowners Price their Lands during Land Expropriation and the Motives Behind It: An Explanation from a WTA/WTP Experiment in Central Beijing," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 51(2), pages 412-427, February.
    15. At, Christian & Béal, Sylvain & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2015. "Freezeout, compensation rules, and voting equilibria," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 91-102.
    16. Christian A. L. Hilber, 2017. "The Economic Implications of House Price Capitalization: A Synthesis," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 45(2), pages 301-339, April.
    17. Pines, David, 1983. "On the Capitalization of Land Improvement Projects," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275375, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    18. Thomas Miceli, 2011. "Free riders, holdouts, and public use: a tale of two externalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 105-117, July.
    19. Alastair McFarlane, 2001. "Rent stabilization and the long-run supply of housing," Urban/Regional 0109001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Stephan Heblich & David Krisztián Nagy & Alex Trew & Yanos Zylberberg, 2023. "The death and life of great British cities," Economics Working Papers 1867, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    H23; R11; R33;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • R11 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes
    • R33 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Nonagricultural and Nonresidential Real Estate Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:anresc:v:51:y:2013:i:3:p:893-915. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.