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Using Eminent Domain for Economic Development: Does it Increase Private Sector Employment?

Author

Listed:
  • Turnbull Geoffrey

    (Department of Finance, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA)

  • Salvino Robert

    (Department of Finance and Economics, Coastal Carolina University, Conway, SC29528, USA)

  • Tasto Michael

    (Department of Finance and Economics, Southern New Hampshire University, Manchester, NH, USA)

Abstract

Although controversial, local and state governments draw on broad interpretations of the Fifth Amendment takings clause to justify using eminent domain for economic development. Previous studies examine such uses from the perspective of property rights and the scope and size of government. This paper addresses the fundamental question: Do states that grant local governments liberal eminent domain powers actually enjoy greater economic growth? This paper estimates how liberal eminent domain laws affect private sector employment growth across states while controlling for national trend and industry mix effects. The results clearly show that allowing local governments to use eminent domain for economic development does not lead to more private sector jobs.

Suggested Citation

  • Turnbull Geoffrey & Salvino Robert & Tasto Michael, 2018. "Using Eminent Domain for Economic Development: Does it Increase Private Sector Employment?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(3), pages 1-24, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:14:y:2018:i:3:p:24:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/rle-2016-0020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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