A Group Utility Maximizer Mechanism for Land Assembly
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DOI: 10.1007/s11146-012-9370-3
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Cited by:
- Portillo, Javier E., 2019. "Land-assembly and externalities: How do positive post-development externalities affect land aggregation outcomes?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 104-124.
- Isaac, R. Mark & Kitchens, Carl & Portillo, Javier E., 2016. "Can buyer “mobility” reduce aggregation failures in land-assembly?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 16-30.
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More about this item
Keywords
Mechanism design; Land assembly; Pareto optimality; Incentive compatibility; Utility functions; Risk-aversion; Risk exchange; JEL Classification; D02; D40; H4; K11;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
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