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Communication, consensus, and knowledge
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Cited by:
- Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2015.
"A model of belief influence in large social networks,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 21-59, May.
- Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2014. "A model of belief influence in large social networks," Working Papers DTE 572, CIDE, División de Economía.
- John Geanakoplos, 1993. "Common Knowledge," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1062, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Shyam Sunder, 2001.
"Knowing What Others Know: Common Knowledge, Accounting, and Capital Markets,"
Yale School of Management Working Papers
ysm326, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2002.
- Shyam Sunder, 2001. "Knowing What Others Know: Common Knowledge, Accounting, and Capital Markets," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm326, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2002.
- Shyam NMI Sunder, 2001. "Knowing What Others Know: Common Knowledge, Accounting, and Capital Markets," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm213, Yale School of Management.
- Benjamin Golub & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Expectations, Networks, and Conventions," Papers 2009.13802, arXiv.org.
- Lucie Ménager, 2005.
"Consensus, Communication and Knowledge: an Extension with Bayesian Agents,"
Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques
v05031, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), revised Jan 2006.
- Lucie Ménager, 2005. "Consensus, communication and knowledge: an extension with bayesian agents," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00194381, HAL.
- Mueller-Frank, Manuel, 2014. "Does one Bayesian make a difference?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 423-452.
- Elchanan Mossel & Allan Sly & Omer Tamuz, 2015.
"Strategic Learning and the Topology of Social Networks,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(5), pages 1755-1794, September.
- Elchanan Mossel & Allan Sly & Omer Tamuz, 2012. "Strategic Learning and the Topology of Social Networks," Papers 1209.5527, arXiv.org, revised May 2015.
- Ménager, Lucie, 2008. "Consensus and common knowledge of an aggregate of decisions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 722-731, March.
- Ryuichiro Ishikawa, 2006. "Communication Protocols with Belief Messages," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 63-74, August.
- Sushil Bikhchandani & David Hirshleifer & Omer Tamuz & Ivo Welch, 2024.
"Information Cascades and Social Learning,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1040-1093, September.
- Sushil Bikhchandani & David Hirshleifer & Omer Tamuz & Ivo Welch, 2021. "Information Cascades and Social Learning," Papers 2105.11044, arXiv.org.
- Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Tamuz, Omer & Welch, Ivo, 2021. "Information Cascades and Social Learning," MPRA Paper 107927, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sushil Bikhchandani & David Hirshleifer & Omer Tamuz & Ivo Welch, 2021. "Information Cascades and Social Learning," NBER Working Papers 28887, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lucie Ménager, 2005. "Consensus, communication and knowledge: an extension with bayesian agents," Post-Print halshs-00194381, HAL.
- , & ,, 2011.
"Agreeing to agree,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
- Ehud Lehrer & Dov Samet, 2003. "Agreeing to agree," Game Theory and Information 0310005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Houy, Nicolas & Ménager, Lucie, 2008.
"Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first?,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 140-152, November.
- Nicolas Houy & Lucie Ménager, 2005. "Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first?," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v05030, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), revised Jan 2006.
- Nicolas Houy & Lucie Ménager, 2008. "Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00650870, HAL.
- Nicolas Houy & Lucie Ménager, 2005. "Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00194365, HAL.
- Peter M. DeMarzo & Dimitri Vayanos & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 2003.
"Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(3), pages 909-968.
- Zwiebel, Jeffrey H. & Vayanos, Dimitri & DeMarzo, Peter M., 2001. "Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Uni-Dimensional Opinions," Research Papers 1719, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- DeMarzo, Peter M. & Vayanos, Dimitri & Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 2003. "Persuasion bias, social influence, and uni-dimensional opinions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 454, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Koessler, Frederic, 2001.
"Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 139-159, September.
- Frédéric Koessler, 2000. "Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication," Working Papers of BETA 2000-05, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Frederic Koessler, 2000. "Common Knowledge and Consensus with Noisy Communication," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0887, Econometric Society.
- Elchanan Mossel & Manuel Mueller‐Frank & Allan Sly & Omer Tamuz, 2020.
"Social Learning Equilibria,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(3), pages 1235-1267, May.
- Elchanan Mossel & Manuel Mueller-Frank & Allan Sly & Omer Tamuz, 2012. "Social learning equilibria," Papers 1207.5895, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2019.
- Jérôme Mathis & Marcello Puca & Simone M. Sepe, 2021. "Deliberative Institutions and Optimality," CSEF Working Papers 614, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 09 Jun 2021.
- Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2009.
"Informational externalities and emergence of consensus,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 979-994, July.
- Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan & Dinah Rosenberg, 2009. "Informational externalities and emergence of consensus," Post-Print hal-00464565, HAL.
- Menager, Lucie, 2006. "Consensus, communication and knowledge: An extension with Bayesian agents," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 274-279, May.
- Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated".
"Agreeing To Disagree: A Survey,"
Department of Economics
97-18, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Agreeing To Disagree: A Survey," Working Papers 177, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Frédéric KOESSLER, 2002. "Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games: A General Model," Working Papers of BETA 2002-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Emilien Macault, 2022. "Stochastic Consensus and the Shadow of Doubt," Papers 2201.12100, arXiv.org.
- Li, Wei & Tan, Xu, 2021. "Cognitively-constrained learning from neighbors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 32-54.
- Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2008.
"Communication Can Destroy Common Learning,"
Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
184, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2008. "Communication Can Destroy Common Learning," Working Papers tecipa-330, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Gul, Faruk & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2016. "Interdependent preference models as a theory of intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 179-208.
- Benedikt V. Meylahn & Arnoud V. den Boer & Michel Mandjes, 2023. "Trusting: Alone and together," Papers 2303.01921, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
- Matan Harel & Elchanan Mossel & Philipp Strack & Omer Tamuz, 2021.
"Rational Groupthink,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 136(1), pages 621-668.
- Matan Harel & Elchanan Mossel & Philipp Strack & Omer Tamuz, 2014. "Rational Groupthink," Papers 1412.7172, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2020.
- Ding, Huihui & Pivato, Marcus, 2021.
"Deliberation and epistemic democracy,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 138-167.
- Huihui Ding & Marcus Pivato, 2021. "Deliberation and epistemic democracy," Post-Print hal-03637874, HAL.
- Monica Billio & Roberto Casarin & Michele Costola & Lorenzo Frattarolo, 2019. "Opinion Dynamics and Disagreements on Financial Networks," Advances in Decision Sciences, Asia University, Taiwan, vol. 23(4), pages 24-51, December.
- Lucie Ménager, 2004. "A note on consensus and common knowledge of an aggregate of decisions," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v04006, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2012. "Consensus in Communication Networks under Bayesian Updating," Working Papers DTE 529, CIDE, División de Economía.
- Foerster, Manuel, 2019. "Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
- ,, 2013. "A general framework for rational learning in social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
- Suzuki, Toru, 2020. "Efficient communication and indexicality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 156-165.
- Azomahou, T. & Opolot, D., 2014. "Beliefs dynamics in communication networks," MERIT Working Papers 2014-034, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
- Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2011.
"Communication, timing, and common learning,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 230-247, January.
- Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2010. "Communication, Timing, and Common Learning," Discussion Papers 1484, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2010. "Communication, Timing, and Common Learning," Working Papers tecipa-389, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Patricia Contreras-Tejada & Giannicola Scarpa & Aleksander M. Kubicki & Adam Brandenburger & Pierfrancesco La Mura, 2021. "Observers of quantum systems cannot agree to disagree," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 12(1), pages 1-7, December.
- Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2011.
"On consensus through communication without a commonly known protocol,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 733-739.
- Tsakas, E. & voorneveld, M., 2010. "On consensus through communication without a commonly known protocol," Research Memorandum 016, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- John Geanakoplos, 1992. "Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 53-82, Fall.
- Crescenzi, Michele, 2022.
"Learning to agree over large state spaces,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
- Michele Crescenzi, 2021. "Learning to agree over large state spaces," Papers 2105.06313, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
- Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2007. "Efficient communication, common knowledge, and consensus," Working Papers in Economics 255, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Keppo, Jussi & Satopää, Ville A., 2024. "Bayesian herd detection for dynamic data," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 285-301.
- Koessler, Frederic, 2004. "Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 292-320, August.
- Bach, Christian W. & Tsakas, Elias, 2014. "Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 48-59.