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Probabilistic assignment of objects: Characterizing the serial rule

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Cited by:

  1. Altuntaş, Açelya & Phan, William & Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 156-181.
  2. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2015. "Size versus fairness in the assignment problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 119-127.
  3. Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, 2016. "Characterizations of the cumulative offer process," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 531-542, October.
  4. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2014. "Assigning agents to a line," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 539-553.
  5. Youngsub Chun & Kiyong Yun, 2020. "Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 667-687, April.
  6. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, 2023. "Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(3), pages 465-484, October.
  7. Chang, Hee-In & Chun, Youngsub, 2017. "Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 80-92.
  8. Heo, Eun Jeong, 2014. "Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: A generalization of the serial rule and its characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 40-47.
  9. Christopher P Chambers & Federico Echenique, 2021. "Empirical Welfare Economics," Papers 2108.03277, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
  10. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars H., 2022. "Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2022-208, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  11. Yajing Chen & Patrick Harless & Zhenhua Jiao, 2021. "The probabilistic rank random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization," Papers 2104.09165, arXiv.org.
  12. Wonki Jo Cho, 2018. "Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 137-162, June.
  13. Bogomolnaia, Anna, 2015. "Random assignment: Redefining the serial rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 308-318.
  14. Shende, Priyanka & Purohit, Manish, 2023. "Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  15. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2018. "The object allocation problem with random priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 71-89.
  16. Youngsub Chun & Boram Park, 2017. "A graph theoretic approach to the slot allocation problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 133-152, January.
  17. Balbuzanov, Ivan, 2020. "Short trading cycles: Paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 78-87.
  18. Priyanka Shende & Manish Purohit, 2020. "Strategy-proof and Envy-free Mechanisms for House Allocation," Papers 2010.16384, arXiv.org.
  19. Heo, Eun Jeong & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2015. "A characterization of the extended serial correspondence," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 102-110.
  20. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 14-25.
  21. Haris Aziz & Yoichi Kasajima, 2017. "Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 255-275, August.
  22. Sulagna Dasgupta & Debasis Mishra, 2022. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 651-664, December.
  23. Yajing Chen, 2017. "New axioms for deferred acceptance," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 393-408, February.
  24. Saban, Daniela & Sethuraman, Jay, 2014. "A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 283-289.
  25. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars, 2024. "On (constrained) Efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment," VfS Annual Conference 2024 (Berlin): Upcoming Labor Market Challenges 302429, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  26. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars, 2021. "Strategy-Proof and Envy-Free Random Assignment," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 307, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  27. Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu & Ünver, M. Utku, 2017. "On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 56-62.
  28. Sulagna Dasgupta & Debasis Mishra, 2020. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model," Papers 2009.13104, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
  29. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 176-179.
  30. Balbuzanov, Ivan, 2022. "Constrained random matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
  31. Ping Zhan, 2023. "A Simple Characterization of Assignment Mechanisms on Set Constraints," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 1-15, June.
  32. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars, 2023. "Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
  33. Hashimoto, Tadashi & Hirata, Daisuke & Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu & Unver, Utku, 2014. "Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  34. Andrew McLennan & Shino Takayama & Yuki Tamura, 2024. "An Efficient, Computationally Tractable School Choice Mechanism," Discussion Papers Series 668, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  35. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars H., 2023. "On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2023-202, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  36. Anna Bogomolnaia, 2015. "The Most Ordinally-Efficient of Random Voting Rules," HSE Working papers WP BRP 106/EC/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  37. Huang, Chao & Tian, Guoqiang, 2017. "Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 1-8.
  38. Harless, Patrick, 2019. "Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 107-116.
  39. Eun Heo, 2014. "The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 439-454, May.
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