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Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment

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  • Basteck, Christian
  • Ehlers, Lars H.

Abstract

We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is unanimous, strategy-proof and envy-free. Weakening the first requirement to q-unanimity - i.e., when every agent ranks a different object at the top, then each agent shall receive his most-preferred object with probability of at least q - we show that a mechanism satisfying strategy-proofness, envy-freeness and ex-post weak non-wastefulness can be q-unanimous only for q È 2/n (where n is the number of agents). To demonstrate that this bound is tight, we introduce a new mechanism, Random-Dictatorship-cum-Equal-Division (RDcED), and show that it achieves this maximal bound when all objects are acceptable. In addition, for three agents, RDcED is characterized by the first three properties and ex-post weak efficiency. If objects may be unacceptable, strategy-proofness and envy-freeness are jointly incompatible even with ex-post weak non-wastefulness.

Suggested Citation

  • Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars H., 2022. "Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2022-208, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2022208
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    random assignment; strategy-proofness; envy-freeness; q-unanimity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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