Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication

Citations

Cited by:

1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2000. "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1521, Econometric Society.
   • Vasiliki Skreta, 2005. "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms," UCLA Economics Online Papers 342, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Vasiliki Skreta, 2010. "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000488, www.najecon.org.
2. Helmut Bester, 2009. "Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(2), pages 269-296, November.
   • Helmut Bester, "undated". "Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights," Papers 027, Departmental Working Papers.
   • Bester, Helmut, 2005. "Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 69, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   • Bester, Helmut, 2005. "Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 5391, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Bester, Helmut, 2005. "Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights," Discussion Papers 2005/21, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
3. Heumann, Tibor, 2020. "On the cardinality of the message space in sender–receiver games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 109-118.
4. Ottorino Chillemi & Benedetto Gui & Lorenzo Rocco, 2017. "Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 737-760, August.
5. Skreta, Vasiliki, 2015. "Optimal auction design under non-commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 854-890.
   • Vasiliki Skreta, 2005. "Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment," UCLA Economics Online Papers 346, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment," Working Papers 08-14, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
   • Vasiliki Skreta, 2013. "Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment," Working Papers 13-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
   • Vasiliki Skreta, 2010. "Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000176, David K. Levine.
6. Beccuti, Juan & Möller, Marc, 2021. "Screening by mode of trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 400-420.
   • Juan Beccuti & Marc Moeller, 2019. "Screening by Mode of Trade," Diskussionsschriften dp1908, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
7. Strausz, Roland, 2012. "Mediated contracts and mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1280-1290.
   • Strausz, Roland, 2010. "Mediated Contracts and Mechanism Design," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 322, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
8. Krahmer, Daniel, 2006. "Message-contingent delegation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 490-506, August.
9. Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2012. "Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1947-1968.
   • Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008. "Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information," Discussion Papers 2008/23, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
   • Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008. "Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 251, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
10. Bisin, Alberto & Rampini, Adriano A., 2006. "Markets as beneficial constraints on the government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 601-629, May.
    • Adriano Rampini & Alberto Bisin, 2005. "Markets as Beneficial Constraints on the Government," 2005 Meeting Papers 325, Society for Economic Dynamics.
11. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2352-2383, October.
    • Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2009. "The Cost of contract renegotiation: evidence from the local public sector," UC3M Working papers. Economics we096742, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00710639, HAL.
    • Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2010. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," TSE Working Papers 10-190, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," Post-Print hal-00710639, HAL.
    • Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2010. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," IDEI Working Papers 637, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00710639, HAL.
    • Martimort, David & Ivaldi, Marc & Gagnepain, Philippe, 2010. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," CEPR Discussion Papers 8042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
12. Mikhail Golosov & Luigi Iovino, 2021. "Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(9), pages 2629-2665.
    • Luigi Iovino & Mikhail Golosov, 2013. "Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment," 2013 Meeting Papers 1020, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Iovino, Luigi & Golosov, Mikhail, 2019. "Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment," CEPR Discussion Papers 14116, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Mikhail Golosov & Luigi Iovino, 2014. "Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment," NBER Working Papers 20633, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
13. Shirley J. , HO, 2007. "R&D Outsourcing Contract with Information Leakage," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007026, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
14. Han, Seungjin, 2022. "General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
15. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1463-1500, July.
    • Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment," Papers 1811.03579, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
16. Breig, Zachary, 2022. "Repeated contracting without commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
17. Zhou, Jianheng & Luo, Yao, 2023. "Bayes information updating and multiperiod supply chain screening," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 256(C).
18. Yaron Leitner, 2010. "Inducing agents to report hidden trades: a theory of an intermediary," Working Papers 10-28, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
19. Praveen Kumar & Nisan Langberg, 2009. "Corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 144-172, March.
20. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
21. Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2019. "Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 356-380.
    • Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2014. "Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 490, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
22. Evans, Robert & Reiche, Sönje, 2015. "Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1159-1187.
23. Alexander, Corinne & Ivanic, Rasto & Rosch, Stephanie & Tyner, Wallace & Wu, Steven Y. & Yoder, Joshua R., 2012. "Contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 970-979.
24. Jenny Simon, 2014. "Imperfect Financial Markets as a Commitment Device for the Government," CESifo Working Paper Series 4902, CESifo.
25. Kumar, Praveen & Langberg, Nisan, 2013. "Information manipulation and rational investment booms and busts," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 408-425.
26. Lim, Wooyoung, 2012. "Selling authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 393-415.