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Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study

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Cited by:

  1. Bosch-Domènech, Antoni & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2013. "On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 52-67.
  2. Andreas Blume & Peter H. Kriss & Roberto A. Weber, 2017. "Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(2), pages 368-395, June.
  3. Andonie, Costel & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2012. "Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 681-700.
  4. Külpmann, Philipp & Khantadze, Davit, 2016. "Identifying the reasons for coordination failure in a laboratory experiment," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 567, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  5. Uri Gneezy & Alex Imas & Kristóf Madarász, 2012. "Conscience Accounting: Emotional Dynamics and Social Behavior," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 563, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  6. Dufwenberg, Martin & Köhlin, Gunnar & Martinsson, Peter & Medhin, Haileselassie, 2016. "Thanks but no thanks: A new policy to reduce land conflict," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 31-50.
  7. Gisèle Umbhauer, 2019. "Traveler’s dilemma : how the value of the luggage influences behavior," Working Papers of BETA 2019-13, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  8. Heller, Yuval & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2020. "Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values (Extended Version)," MPRA Paper 102926, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Jul 2021.
  9. repec:cep:stitep:/2012/563 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Alessandro Sontuoso & Sudeep Bhatia, 2021. "A notion of prominence for games with natural‐language labels," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), pages 283-312, January.
  11. Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß, 2019. "Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1001-1031, December.
  12. Blume, Andreas & Noussair, Charles N. & Ye, Bohan, 2024. "Fragile meaning - an experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
  13. Stracke, Rudi & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Sunde, Uwe, 2017. "Coping with complexity – Experimental evidence for narrow bracketing in multi-stage contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 264-281.
  14. He, Simin & Wu, Jiabin, 2020. "Compromise and coordination: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 216-233.
  15. Luhan, Wolfgang J. & Poulsen, Anders U. & Roos, Michael W.M., 2017. "Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 687-699.
  16. Bardsley, Nicholas & Ule, Aljaž, 2017. "Focal points revisited: Team reasoning, the principle of insufficient reason and cognitive hierarchy theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 74-86.
  17. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2013. "Hidden symmetries and focal points," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 226-258.
  18. Andreas Blume & April Franco, 2002. "Learning from failure," Staff Report 299, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  19. Sitzia, Stefania & Zheng, Jiwei, 2019. "Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points – an experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 461-478.
  20. Heller, Yuval & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2024. "Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 51-76.
  21. Gary Charness & Alessandro Sontuoso, 2018. "The Doors of Perception," PPE Working Papers 0013, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 25 Oct 2018.
  22. Uri Gneezy & Alex Imas & Kristóf Madarász, 2014. "Conscience Accounting: Emotion Dynamics and Social Behavior," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(11), pages 2645-2658, November.
  23. Christoph Kuzmics & Daniel Rodenburger, 2018. "A case of evolutionary stable attainable equilibrium in the lab," Graz Economics Papers 2018-05, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
  24. Oliver J. Board & Kim-Sau Chung, 2022. "Object-based unawareness: Theory and applications," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 7(1), pages 1-43, December.
  25. Stefania Sitzia & Jiwei Zheng, 2017. "Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points: An experimental investigation," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 17-02, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  26. Ciril Bosch-Rosa & Thomas Meissner, 2020. "The one player guessing game: a diagnosis on the relationship between equilibrium play, beliefs, and best responses," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(4), pages 1129-1147, December.
  27. Elten, Jonas van & Penczynski, Stefan P., 2020. "Coordination games with asymmetric payoffs: An experimental study with intra-group communication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 158-188.
  28. Anders Poulsen & Axel Sonntag, 2019. "Focality is Intuitive - Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Time Pressure in Coordination Games," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 19-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  29. Rojo Arjona, David & Sitzia, Stefania & Zheng, Jiwei, 2022. "Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 505-523.
  30. Kuzmics, Christoph & Palfrey, Thomas & Rogers, Brian W., 2014. "Symmetric play in repeated allocation games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 25-67.
  31. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Luigi Luini, 2017. "Does Focality Depend on the Mode of Cognition? Experimental Evidence on Pure Coordination Games," Department of Economics University of Siena 771, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  32. Bett, Zoë & Poulsen, Anders & Poulsen, Odile, 2016. "The focality of dominated compromises in tacit coordination situations: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 29-34.
  33. Marco Faillo & Alessandra Smerilli & Robert Sugden, 2016. "Can a single theory explain coordination? An experiment on alternative modes of reasoning and the conditions under which they are used," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  34. Stefania Sitzia & Jiwei Zheng, 2018. "Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points: An experimental investigation," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 17-02R, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  35. Zhang, Shuhua & Zhang, Zhipeng & Wu, Yu’e & Yan, Ming & Li, Yu, 2019. "Strategy preference promotes cooperation in spatial evolutionary games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 514(C), pages 181-188.
  36. Chlaß, Nadine & Perea, Andrés, 2016. "How do people reason in dynamic games?," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145881, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  37. Faillo, Marco & Smerilli, Alessandra & Sugden, Robert, 2017. "Bounded best-response and collective-optimality reasoning in coordination games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 317-335.
  38. David Rojo Arjona & Stefania Sitzia & Jiwei Zheng, 2021. "Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points," Working Papers 335109305, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  39. Feinberg, Yossi, 2005. "Games with Incomplete Awareness," Research Papers 1894, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
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