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Games with Incomplete Awareness

Author

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  • Feinberg, Yossi

    (Stanford U)

Abstract

A new game form termed games with incomplete awareness is defined. This game form captures unawareness as to other players' actions, as well as unawareness of the existence of some players. It also captures interactive unawareness: the awareness of players as to what other players are aware of, and so on. An extended Nash equilibrium solution is defined and studied in these games.

Suggested Citation

  • Feinberg, Yossi, 2005. "Games with Incomplete Awareness," Research Papers 1894, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1894
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    File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP1894.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Feinberg, Yossi, 2004. "Subjective Reasoning--Games with Unawareness," Research Papers 1875, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
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    10. Ewerhart, Christian, 2001. "Heterogeneous Awareness and the Possibility of Agreement," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-30, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Liu Zhen, 2017. "Information Acquisition in the Era of Fair Disclosure: An Application of Asymmetric Awareness," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(2), pages 1-16, June.
    2. Martin Meier & Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 219-249, June.
    3. Blume, Andreas & Gneezy, Uri, 2010. "Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 488-511, March.
    4. Simon Grant & John Quiggin, 2013. "Inductive reasoning about unawareness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 717-755, November.
    5. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2008. "A canonical model for interactive unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 304-324, January.
    6. Xiaojian Zhao, 2008. "Moral Hazard With Unawareness," Rationality and Society, , vol. 20(4), pages 471-496, November.
    7. Perea, Andrés, 2022. "Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 11-30.
    8. Liu, Zhen, 2006. "Fair Disclosure and Investor Asymmetric Awareness in Stock Markets," MPRA Paper 917, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2008. "A canonical model for interactive unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 304-324, January.
    10. Leandro Rêgo & Joseph Halpern, 2012. "Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 131-155, February.

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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