The Doors of Perception
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- Gary Charness & Alessandro Sontuoso, 2018. "The Doors of Perception," PPE Working Papers 0013, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 25 Oct 2018.
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Cited by:
- Francesco Fallucchi & Daniele Nosenzo, 2022.
"The coordinating power of social norms,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, February.
- Francesco Fallucchi & Daniele Nosenzo, 2020. "The Coordinating Power of Social Norms," Economics Working Papers 2020-06, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- Francesco Fallucchi & Daniele Nosenzo, 2020. "The Coordinating Power of Social Norms," Discussion Papers 2020-14, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Rojo Arjona, David & Sitzia, Stefania & Zheng, Jiwei, 2022.
"Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 505-523.
- David Rojo-Arjona & R. Stefania Sitzia & Jiwei Zheng, 2021. "Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 21-02, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- David Rojo Arjona & Stefania Sitzia & Jiwei Zheng, 2021. "Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points," Working Papers 335109305, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
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More about this item
Keywords
Frames; Unawareness; Focal Points; Coordination Games;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2020-01-27 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2020-01-27 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2020-01-27 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2020-01-27 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
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