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Hard evidence and mechanism design
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Cited by:
- Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2014.
"Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(12), pages 3779-3813, December.
- Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2013. "Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 2013-003, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Sergiu Hart & Ilan Kremer & Motty Perry, 2017.
"Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(3), pages 690-713, March.
- Hart, Sergiu & Kremer, Ilan & Perry, Motty, 2015. "Evidence Games : Truth and Commitment," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1091, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Sergiu Hart & Ilan Kremer & Motty Perry, 2015. "Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment," Discussion Paper Series dp684, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Hart, Sergiu & Kremer, Ilan & Perry, Motty, 2015. "Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment," Economic Research Papers 270003, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Hart, Sergiu & Kremer, Ilan & Perry, Motty, 2015. "Evidence Games : Truth and Commitment," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 06, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
- Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2017.
"Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(9), pages 2666-2694, September.
- Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2016. "Optimal Allocation With Ex-Post Verification And Limited Penalties," Working Papers 2016_21, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Roland Strausz, 2023.
"Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence,"
Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers
0030, Berlin School of Economics.
- Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Roland Strausz, 2024. "Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 504, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015.
"Price discrimination through communication,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
- Itai Sher & Rakesh Vohra, 2011. "Price Discrimination Through Communication," Discussion Papers 1536, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Elchanan Ben‐Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2019.
"Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(2), pages 529-566, March.
- Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2017. "Mechanisms with Evidence: Commitment and Robustness," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2017-001, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- , & ,, 2012.
"Implementation with evidence,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
- Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Implementation with Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00754592, HAL.
- Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Implementation with Evidence," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754592, HAL.
- Schopohl, Simon, 2016.
"Communication games with optional verification,"
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers
569, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Communication Games with Optional Verification," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 17011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- SCHOPOHL Simon,, 2018. "Communicaiton games with optional verification," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2018013, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Koessler, Frederic & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2019.
"Selling with evidence,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
- Skreta, Vasiliki & Koessler, Frédéric, 2017. "Selling with Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 12049, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019. "Selling with Evidence," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01884387, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019. "Selling with Evidence," Post-Print halshs-01884387, HAL.
- Mehdi Ayouni & Frédéric Koessler, 2017.
"Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(3), pages 327-339, March.
- Mehdi Ayouni & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01503765, HAL.
- Mehdi Ayouni & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion," Post-Print halshs-01503765, HAL.
- Konrad Stahl & Roland Strausz, 2017.
"Certification and Market Transparency,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(4), pages 1842-1868.
- Stahl, Konrad & Strausz, Roland, 2014. "Certification and Market Transparency," Working Papers 14-26, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
- Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Certification and Market Transparency," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 3, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Stahl, Konrad & Strausz, Roland, 2014. "Certification and market transparency," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2014-041, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
- Clausen, Andrew, 2013.
"Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals,"
SIRE Discussion Papers
2013-13, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Andrew Clausen, 2013. "Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 225, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012.
"Implementation with partial provability,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1689-1724.
- Barton L. Lipman & Elchanan Ben-Porath, 2010. "Implementation with Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-018, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Communication Games with Optional Verification," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01490688, HAL.
- Cotton, Christopher, 2009.
"Should we tax or cap political contributions? A lobbying model with policy favors and access,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 831-842, August.
- Christopher Cotton, 2008. "Should We Tax or Cap Political Contributions? A Lobbying Model with Policy Favors and Access," Working Papers 0901, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Cotton, Christopher, 2012. "Pay-to-play politics: Informational lobbying and contribution limits when money buys access," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 369-386.
- Joshua S. Gans, 2019. "The Fine Print in Smart Contracts," NBER Working Papers 25443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Albin Erlanson & Andreas Kleiner, 2024. "Optimal allocations with capacity constrained verification," Papers 2409.02031, arXiv.org.
- Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2019.
"Statistical evidence and the problem of robust litigation,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(4), pages 974-1003, December.
- Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2018. "Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Robust Litigation," Working Papers 1801, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2019. "Statistical evidence and the problem of robust litigation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt4110q2cb, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- ,, 2014. "Persuasion and dynamic communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
- Gorkem Celik, 2015. "Implementation by Gradual Revelation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 271-296, June.
- PRAM, Kym, 2017. "Hard evidence and welfare in adverse selection environments," Economics Working Papers MWP 2017/10, European University Institute.
- Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019.
"Evidence reading mechanisms,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 375-397, October.
- Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence Reading Mechanisms," Post-Print halshs-02302036, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence Reading Mechanisms," SciencePo Working papers Main halshs-02302036, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence Reading Mechanisms," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02302036, HAL.
- Bull Jesse, 2008. "Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-20, May.
- Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò, 2016. "Information Disclosure under Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions," Working Papers 904, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Watson, Joel, 2006. "Contract and Mechanism Design in Settings with Multi-Period Trade," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt63s1s3j6, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2020.
"Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
- Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2018. "Bayesian Implementation and Rent Extraction in a Multi-Dimensional Procurement Problem," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 133, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004.
"Evidence disclosure and verifiability,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2000. "Evidence Disclosure and Verifiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt6th0060j, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2002. "Evidence Disclosure and Verfiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt19p7z2gm, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022.
"Long information design,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," Post-Print halshs-02400053, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02400053, HAL.
- Koessler, Frédéric & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," TSE Working Papers 22-1341, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Fabian Herweg & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2020.
"Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 2194-2212, May.
- Schmidt, Klaus & Herweg, Fabian, 2017. "Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies," CEPR Discussion Papers 12385, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2017. "Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 47, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Soumen Banerjee & Yi-Chun Chen & Yifei Sun, 2021. "Direct Implementation with Evidence," Papers 2105.12298, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
- Peralta, Esteban, 2019. "Bayesian implementation with verifiable information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 65-72.
- Christopher Cotton, 2009. "Competition for Access and Full Revelation of Evidence," Working Papers 2010-12, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Ayça Özdoðan, 2016. "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21.
- Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2007.
"Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1877-1900, December.
- Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Consensus building: How to persuade a group," Working Papers halshs-00590459, HAL.
- Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2007. "Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group," Post-Print halshs-00754650, HAL.
- Caillaud, Bernard & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group," IDEI Working Papers 435, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Consensus building: How to persuade a group," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590459, HAL.
- Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2007. "Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754650, HAL.
- Aurélie Slechten, 2020.
"Environmental Agreements under Asymmetric Information,"
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(3), pages 455-481.
- Aurélie Slechten, 2015. "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information," Working Papers 95042257, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- Elchanan Ben-Porath & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "Implementation and Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2009-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3709dm0u7h9t9qlfe9vrqtn8ed is not listed on IDEAS
- Marina Halac & Pierre Yared, 2016.
"Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification,"
NBER Working Papers
22936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Halac, Marina & Yared, Pierre, 2018. "Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification," CEPR Discussion Papers 12572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bharat Anand & Ron Shachar, 2007. "(Noisy) communication," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 211-237, September.
- Francisco Silva, 2020. "Self-evaluations," Documentos de Trabajo 554, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Banerjee, Soumen & Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 2024. "Direct implementation with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
- repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00754592 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kolotilin, Anton, 2015.
"Experimental design to persuade,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
- Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Experimental Design to Persuade," Discussion Papers 2013-17, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Mierendorff, Konrad, 2016. "Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 190-222.
- Geoffrey A. Chua & Gaoji Hu & Fang Liu, 2023. "Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 455-488, October.
- Evans, R., Reiche, S. & Reiche, S., 2022. "When is a Contrarian Adviser Optimal?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2222, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Raymond Deneckere & Sergei Severinov, 2022. "Signalling, screening and costly misrepresentation," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1334-1370, August.
- Roland Strausz, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2040, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Joel Watson, 2013.
"Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons,"
Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-40, August.
- Watson, Joel, 2006. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0wx67671, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005.
"Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
- F. Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2003. "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types," THEMA Working Papers 2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2003. "A Model of Optimal Persuasion Rules," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000012, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ralph Boleslavsky & Tracy R. Lewis, 2011. "Advocacy and Dynamic Delegation," Working Papers 2011-7, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3709dm0u7h9t9qlfe9vrqtn8ed is not listed on IDEAS
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jerôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long information design," Post-Print hal-03700394, HAL.
- Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 45, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Jordi Blanes i Vidal & Marc Möller, 2013.
"Decision–Making and Implementation in Teams,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp1208, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Blanes i Vidal, Jordi & Möller, Marc, 2013. "Decision-making and implementation in teams," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 51544, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Soumen Banerjee & Yi-Chun Chen, 2022. "Implementation with Uncertain Evidence," Papers 2209.10741, arXiv.org.
- Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "On the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000166, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Deneckere, Raymond & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Mechanism design with partial state verifiability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 487-513, November.
- Koray, Semih & Yildiz, Kemal, 2018. "Implementation via rights structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 479-502.
- Erlanson, Albin & Kleiner, Andreas, 2020.
"Costly verification in collective decisions,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
- Albin Erlanson & Andreas Kleiner, 2019. "Costly Verification in Collective Decisions," Papers 1910.13979, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2020.
- Shaofei Jiang, 2019. "Disclosure Games with Large Evidence Spaces," Papers 1910.13633, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
- Silva, Francisco, 2019. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jerôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long information design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03700394, HAL.
- Joel Watson, 2021.
"Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts,"
Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 631-659, August.
- Watson, Joel, 2021. "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt19f9w2xf, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Sergei Severinov, 2017. "Disclosure and Legal Advice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 188-225, May.
- Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.