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Biased contests for symmetric players

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dahm, Matthias & Esteve-González, Patricia, 2018. "Affirmative action through extra prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 123-142.
  2. Heijnen, Pim & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2019. "Rent-seeking with uncertain discriminatory power," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 103-114.
  3. Federico Echenique & Anqi Li, 2022. "Rationally Inattentive Statistical Discrimination: Arrow Meets Phelps," Papers 2212.08219, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
  4. Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Szech, Nora, 2023. "Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants: An experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
  5. Denter, Philipp & Sisak, Dana, 2016. "Head starts in dynamic tournaments?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 94-97.
  6. Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric, 2018. "Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 22-37.
  7. Engelbert J. Dockner & Steffen Jørgensen, 2018. "Strategic Rivalry for Market Share: A Contest Theory Approach to Dynamic Advertising Competition," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 468-489, September.
  8. Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2019. "A General Framework for Studying Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 7993, CESifo.
  9. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "Tournament rewards and heavy tails," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
  10. Yizhaq Minchuk & Aner Sela, 2021. "Subsidy and Taxation in All-Pay Auctions under Incomplete," Working Papers 2104, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  11. Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2020. "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 243-271, July.
  12. Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 513-535.
  13. Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2024. "Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 526-556.
  14. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2023. "Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests," PIER Working Paper Archive 23-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  15. De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2018. "The adverse consequences of tournaments: Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 1-18.
  16. Goel, Sumit & Goyal, Amit, 2023. "Optimal tie-breaking rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
  17. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests," Working Papers w0278, New Economic School (NES).
  18. Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2021. "Winner’s effort maximization in large contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
  19. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019. "The shape of luck and competition in tournaments," Working Papers w0251, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  20. Boosey, Luke & Brookins, Philip & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2019. "Contests between groups of unknown size," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 756-769.
  21. René Kirkegaard, 2020. "Microfounded Contest Design," Working Papers 2003, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  22. Drugov, Mikhail & Meyer, Margaret & Möller, Marc, 2022. "Selecting the Best when Selection is Hard," CEPR Discussion Papers 17484, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  23. Malin Arve & Olga Chiappinelli, 2021. "The Role of Budget Constraints in Sequential Elimination Tournaments," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(4), pages 1059-1087, October.
  24. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2020. "Confidence Management in Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 27186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Noam Cohen & Guy Maor & Aner Sela, 2018. "Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(3), pages 177-192, December.
  26. Penghuan Yan, 2024. "Balancing Selection Efficiency and Societal Costs in Selective Contests," Papers 2409.09768, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
  27. Timothy Mathews & Soiliou Daw Namoro & James W. Boudreau, 2023. "The Impact of Organizer Market Structure on Participant Entry Behavior in a Multi-Tournament Environment," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-21, January.
  28. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
  29. Shelegia, Sandro & Wilson, Chris M., 2022. "Costly participation and default allocations in all-pay contests," MPRA Paper 115027, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  30. Benoit S Y Crutzen & Sabine Flamand, 2021. "Leaders, Factions and Electoral Success," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-041/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
  31. Crutzen, Benoît S.Y. & Flamand, Sabine, 2023. "Leaders, factions and the determinants of electoral success," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
  32. Enzo Brox & Daniel Goller, 2024. "Tournaments, Contestant Heterogeneity and Performance," Papers 2401.05210, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
  33. Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2023. "Complete-rent-dissipation contest design," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
  34. Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Optimal favoritism in contests with identity-contingent prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 196(C), pages 40-50.
  35. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Winner-Take-All Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 12067, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  36. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023. "Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
  37. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2022. "To Fight or to Give Up? Dynamic Contests with a Deadline," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(11), pages 8144-8165, November.
  38. Bhattacharya, Puja & Rampal, Jeevant, 2024. "Contests within and between groups: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 467-492.
  39. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Drugov, Mikhail, 2020. "The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
  40. Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2022. "Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 1-30.
  41. Zhu, Feng, 2021. "On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
  42. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2020. "Extractive contest design," Papers 2006.01808, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2022.
  43. Wasser, Cédric & Zhang, Mengxi, 2023. "Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 90-111.
  44. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan, 2020. "On the optimal design of biased contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
  45. Serena, Marco, 2017. "Quality contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 15-25.
  46. Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2022. "Simple equilibria in general contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 264-280.
  47. Drugov, Mikhail, 2015. "Optimal Patronage," CEPR Discussion Papers 10343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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