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Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Juan I. Beccuti, 2014. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms under Imperfect Commitment: Extending to the Multi-Period Case," Diskussionsschriften dp1402, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  2. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée, 2006. "Incentives For Corruptible Auditors In The Absence Of Commitment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 269-291, June.
  3. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1463-1500, July.
  4. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. Heumann, Tibor, 2020. "On the cardinality of the message space in sender–receiver games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 109-118.
  6. Ottorino Chillemi & Benedetto Gui & Lorenzo Rocco, 2017. "Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 737-760, August.
  7. Mikhail Golosov & Luigi Iovino, 2021. "Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(9), pages 2629-2665.
  8. Seungjin Han, 2021. "Robust Equilibria in General Competing Mechanism Games," Papers 2109.13177, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
  9. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
  10. Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2022. "Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022-05, McMaster University.
  11. Skreta, Vasiliki, 2015. "Optimal auction design under non-commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 854-890.
  12. Azrieli, Yaron & Jain, Ritesh, 2018. "Symmetric mechanism design," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 108-118.
  13. Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Constrained Communication with Multiple Agents: Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Public Good Provision," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 166, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  14. Evans, Robert & Reiche, Sönje, 2008. "Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case with transferable utility," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 611-614, June.
  15. Christian Langpap, 2008. "Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(4), pages 489-506, August.
  16. Yaron Leitner, 2010. "Inducing agents to report hidden trades: a theory of an intermediary," Working Papers 10-28, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  17. Wu, Zhengping & Crama, Pascale & Zhu, Wanshan, 2012. "The newsvendor’s optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(1), pages 171-181.
  18. Markus Möller, 2024. "Transparent Matching Mechanisms," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 306, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  19. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
  20. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  21. Krahmer, Daniel, 2006. "Message-contingent delegation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 490-506, August.
  22. Kawamura, Kohei, 2008. "Communication for Public Goods," SIRE Discussion Papers 2008-25, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  23. Daske, Thomas, 2016. "Pooling hawks and doves: Interim-efficient labor contracts for other-regarding agents," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145951, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  24. Kohei Kawamura, 2008. "Communication for Public Goods," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 182, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  25. Krähmer, Daniel, 2002. "Delegation versus authority [Delegation versus Autorität]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 02-26, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  26. Lamping, Jennifer, 2008. "The Value of Commitment in Auctions with Matching," MPRA Paper 24373, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  27. Wei Chen & Milind Dawande & Ganesh Janakiraman, 2018. "Optimal Procurement Auctions Under Multistage Supplier Qualification," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 566-582, July.
  28. Terstiege, Stefan, 2018. "On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 83-86.
  29. Aram Grigoryan & Markus Moller, 2024. "Robust Market Design with Opaque Announcements," Papers 2408.04509, arXiv.org.
  30. Han, Seungjin, 2022. "General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
  31. Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li, 2020. "Credible Auctions: A Trilemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 425-467, March.
  32. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  33. Jenny Simon, 2014. "Imperfect Financial Markets as a Commitment Device for the Government," CESifo Working Paper Series 4902, CESifo.
  34. Schmöller, Arno, 2010. "Bidding Behavior, Seller Strategies, and the Utilization of Information in Auctions for Complex Goods," Munich Dissertations in Economics 11175, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  35. Qingmin Liu & Konrad Mierendorff & Xianwen Shi & Weijie Zhong, 2019. "Auctions with Limited Commitment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(3), pages 876-910, March.
  36. Aranyak Mehta & Andres Perlroth, 2023. "Auctions without commitment in the auto-bidding world," Papers 2301.07312, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
  37. Juan I. Beccuti, 2014. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms under Imperfect Commitment," Diskussionsschriften dp1401, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
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